Nova Southeastern University

NSUWorks
Faculty Scholarship

Shepard Broad College of Law

Fall 1999

Survey of Florida Law: Real Property
Ronald B. Brown
Nova Southeastern University - Shepard Broad Law Center, brownron@nova.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/law_facarticles
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

NSUWorks Citation
Ronald B. Brown, Survey of Florida Law: Real Property, 24 Nova L. Rev. 267 (1999),
Available at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/law_facarticles/89

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Shepard Broad College of Law at NSUWorks. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more
information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation:
Ronald Benton Brown; Joseph M. Grohman, Survey of
Florida Law: Real Property, 24 Nova L. Rev. 267
(1999)
Provided by:
NSU Shepard Broad College of Law Panza Maurer Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Fri Sep 14 17:04:16 2018
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your
acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions
of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
Use QR Code reader to send PDF
to your smartphone or tablet device

Survey of Florida Law: Real Property
Ronald Benton Brown* and Joseph M. Grohman*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
268
I. INTRODUCrION ..............................................................................
268
1I. ATTORNEYS' FEES .........................................................................
268
A. Eminent Domain ....................................................................
268
1. Statutory Changes .............................................................
269
2. Trial ...................................................................................
271
3. Appellate ...........................................................................
273
B. Landlord and Tenant..............................................................
273
III. BROKERS .......................................................................................
A. Discipline and Licensing ....................................................... 273
B. BrokerageAgreements and Commissions ............................. 275
276
IV. CONDOMINIUMS ............................................................................
280
V . CONSTRUCITON .............................................................................
VI. COOPERATIVES ..................................... t........................................ 283
VII. DEEDS, RESTRICTIONS, AND COVENANTS ..................................... 285
285
VIII. EASEMENTS ...................................................................................
293
IX. ELECTIVE SHARE ...........................................................................
293
X . EMINENT DOMAIN .........................................................................
293
A . Condemnation........................................................................
293
1. In General ..........................................................................
299
2. Quick Taking ..............................
301
B. Inverse Condemnation...........................................................
305
XI. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ..................................................................
XII. HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS ..................................................... 308
XIII. INSURANCE ........................... :........................................................ 309
310
XIV. LANDLORD AND TENANT ...............................................................
319
XV. LIENS .............................................................................................
324
XVI. MORTGAGES ............................................................................
XVII. OPTIONS AND RIGHTS OF FIRST REFUSAL ..................................... 340
Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University.
B.S.M.E., 1970, Northeastern University; J.D., 1973, University of Connecticut; LL.M, 1976,
Temple University.
**
Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University.
B.A., 1966, Glassboro State College; M.A., 1971, California State University, Long Beach;
J.D., 1975, University of Miami.
*

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 24:267

XVII[. RIPARIAN RIGHTS ..........................................................................
XIX . SALES .............................................................................................
XX. SLANDER OF TITLE ........................................................................
XXI. TAXATION ......................................................................................
XXII. TIMESHARES
XXIII. TITLE INSURANCE ..........................................................................
XXIV. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................

342
345
353
355
361

364

365

I. INTRODUCTION
This survey covers judicial decisions and Florida legislation that
appeared between July 1, 1998 and June 30, 1999. Real estate law continues
to develop in interesting ways and the authors have selected the cases and
statutes that they think will be of particular interest to real estate
practitioners and others involved with Florida real estate law.I The authors
do not intend this survey to be all inclusive. 2 The general goal is to inform
the reader, but on occasion the authors felt compelled to voice disagreement
or hopes for the future.
II. ATTORNEYS' FEES
A.

Eminent Domain
1. Statutory Changes

1999 Fla. Laws. ch 385 is a huge act relating to the Department of
Transportation. 3 Buried deep within this act are some significant changes to4
provisions relating to attorneys' fees under the eminent domain statutes.
The most important changes are: section 73.015(4) of the Florida Statutes
will provide for attorneys' fees and costs when the parties reach agreement
without litigating;5 the condemnee will no longer be able to recover
1.
Note that this article does not include zoning and land use because those are
covered in a different article.
2.
When dealing with legislation, the authors strongly recommend reading the entire
act.
3.
Under article ITI, section 5 of the Florida Constitution, a legislative act is limited
to one subject. If this act satisfies the one subject rule, then the rule is entirely meaningless.
4.
For further discussion see the Eminent Domain section infra Part X. See also
Paul D. Bain, 1999 Amendments to Florida'sEminent Domain Statutes, THE FLA. B.J., Nov.

1999 at 68, 68-71.
5.
Ch. 99-385, § 57(4), Fla. Laws 3820, 3878-79 (codified as amended FLA.
73.015(4) (1999)).

STAT.

§
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prejudgment interest on attorneys' fees and costs; 6 the modification of the
calculation of the benefit achieved by the attorney, which is the basis for
calculating attorneys' fees, to include nonmonetary benefits; and a schedule
to use in the calculating the fees from the benefit.7

2. Trial
8

Department of Transportationv. Skidmore.

The district court found

that the decision the trial court made followed the correct approach for
calculating fees.9 The district court determined the benefits that had been
obtained for the clients, calculated the lodestar figure using the factors listed
in the statute,10 and then decided "whether to adjust that figure based on the
total benefits obtained."' However, the attorneys' fees were $900,000,
when the benefit obtained was only $1,225,000.12 The attorneys' fee were
equal to almost seventy-five percent of the benefit, in contrast to the norm

which was twenty-five to thirty-five percent.1 3 In fact, the client was not
entitled to keep all the money that the Department of Transportation had
deposited in the registry of the court at the beginning of this quick take
proceeding.' 4 These factors alone made the district court state, "we would
find ourselves hard-pressed to affirm this award."'1 5
In addition, other errors necessitated reversal. First, in calculating the
client's benefit, the court included the value of the Department of
Transportation's rebuilding of a pier, despite the fact that the client, and its
6.
Id. Paul D. Bain questioned the constitutionality of this provision based on the
supreme court's reasoning in Boulis v. Florida Dep't of Trans., 733 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1999).
Bain, supra, note 4, at 70. Boulis is discussed infra text accompanying notes 333-43, that
prejudgment interest on costs is required by the Florida Constitution.
7.
Ch. 49-385, § 60, 1999 Fla. Laws 3820, 3880 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 73.091
(1999)).
8.
720 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
9.
Id. at 1129.
10. Id. at 1128.
The novelty, difficulty, and importance of the questions involved.
The skill employed by the attorney in conducting the cause.
The amount of money involved.
The responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the attorney.
The attorney's time and labor reasonably required adequately to represent the
client in relation to the benefits resulting to the client.

Id. (quoting RtA. STAT. § 73.092(2)(a)-(e) (1991)).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Skidmore, 720 So. 2d at 1129.
Id.
Id. at 1130.
Id.
Id.

270
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attorney, had vigorously opposed the rebuilding.' 6 Second, in calculating the
number of hours expended by the attorneys, the court included the time that
they had spent litigating the question of whether their client improperly
filled in sovereignty lands.17 The district court held that to be a matter that
was merely incidental
to the eminent domain proceedings and, therefore, not
18
compensable.
Finally, in taxing costs, the trial court was bound by the Statewide
Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of Costs. 19 While "[t]he trial court may
deviate from the Guidelines depending on the facts of the case as justice may
require, ' 2° the trial court went too far here. It was error to include office
expenses such as postage, long distance calls, fax transmissions and delivery
* 21
services.
It was error to award computer research costs that should have
been considered as overhead.22 In addition, it was also error to include travel
expenses for experts and witnesses where the record did not reflect that they
had to travel from out of state.2 3 Furthermore, it was error to award the law
firm's surcharge assessed on other expenses.24
2 5 The condemnee sought
Teeter v. Department of Transportation.
attorneys' fees under section 73.092 of the FloridaStatutes.26 The trial court
awarded fees based solely upon the monetary benefits achieved for the client
under section 73.092(1), which provided, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this section, the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award
attorneys' fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client."27 The
trial court rejected the condemnee's additional request for fees under section
28
29
73.092(2). The district court affirmed. Section 73.092(2) provided for
the payment of attorneys' fees where such fees have been "incurred in
defeating an order of taking, or for an apportionment, or other supplemental
proceedings."30 This case was settled before it went to trial.3 ' Utilizing the
plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation, the court concluded that
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Skidmore, 720 So. 2d at 1129.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1130-31.
Id. at 1130.
Skidmore, 720 So. 2d at 1130.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1130-31.
713 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 1091; FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (Supp. 1994).

27.

Teeter, 713 So. 2d at 1091; FLA.

28.
29.

Teeter, 713 So. 2d at 1091.
Id.

30.

Id.; FLA.

31.

Teeter,713 So. 2d at 1091-92.

STAT.

§ 73.092(2).

STAT.§

73.092(1).
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section 73.092(2) simply did not apply to this situation.32 Furthermore, the
condemnee was not entitled to attorneys' fees for hours spent litigating the
attorneys' fees issue because that was not provided for by the statute.3 3
Judge Sharp concurred specially in order to urge the legislature to
reconsider the potential constitutional defects in the statute.34 Although
acknowledging that no constitutional issues had been raised in this case, she
noted that the statute was "fraught with problems and may be
constitutionally defective." 35 Under the Florida Constitution, the condemnee
is entitled to attorneys' fees, as part of the mandated compensation. 36 The
limit of the statute on attorneys' fees, based upon37 the nature of the
proceeding, may shortchange some future condenees.
3. Appellate
Department of Transportation v. Skinners Wholesale Nursery, Inc.38
The land in this case was the subject of a "quick take. 39 The parties agreed
on all issues except business damages which went to trial. 40 The Department
of Transportation's ("DOT") position was that business damages were
$130,000, but the final judgment awarded to the landowner was
$2,950,000.'41 Of course, the DOT appealed, but the landowner prevailed
again and the award was upheld. 42 In calculating appellate attorneys' fees,
the trial court determined a reasonable hourly rate of $250 per hour.43 It
concluded from the evidence that 100.75 hours had been expended in the
case. 44 The hours expended produced a lodestar fee of $25,187.50. 45 The
court then "applied what it described as a 'results obtained' enhancement in
an amount equal to 2.5% of the $2,950,000, the amount of the business
damages awarded at trial, or $73,750; and rounded the awarded fee to
$98,000." 6 The DOT appealed the addition of the enhancement and the
32. Id. at 1092.
33. Id.

34. Id. (Sharp, J., concurring).
35. Id.
36. Teeter, 713 So.2d at 1092 (citing FLA. CONST. art. X,§ 6(a)).
37. See FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1999).
38. 736 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1998).

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
at 5.
Id.
at 3.

43. Skinners Wholesale Nursery, Inc., 736 So. 2d at 5.

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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district court reluctantly reversed, although it did not find the award to be
excessive. 47
The use of the lodestar approach was the correct way to approach
appellate attorneys' fees. Moreover, applying an enhancement for results
obtained might be justified in the rare case where the quality of service and
the results obtained were exceptional. 48 However, it would be inappropriate
to use a risk multiplier because that is designed to compensate the lawyer for
the risk of not getting paid in a contingent fee case. 49 In this eminent domain
proceeding where the condemning authority had appealed, attorneys' fees
were mandated by statute,50 so there was no risk that this attorney would not
get paid. 51 Unfortunately, the trial court's order, and the evidence on which it
was based, considered the risk of losing on appeal as a factor in calculating
the enhancement. Thus reversal was requiredl33.
Seminole County v. Boyle Investment Co.54 In this condemnation case,
the county had appealed the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to the
landowner.55 The district court reversed the award of interest on the
attorneys' fees and the inclusion of expert witness fees, but affirmed on all
other points. 56 The county then opposed the landowner's motion for
appellate attorneys' fees, apparently on the theory that it had been the
prevailing party on the appeal. 57 However, the district court concluded that
the legislature mandated landowners to receive reasonable appellate
attorneys' fees in all eminent domain cases, unless the appeal was filed by
the landowner and the appeal was unsuccessful. 58 The exception did not
apply to this case because the appeal had been filed by the county.5 9

47.
48.
49.
51.
52.

See id. at 8-9.
See Skinners Wholesale Nursery, Inc., 736 So. 2d at 9.
See id. at 8.
Id. at 3; FLA. STAT. § 73.131(2) (1993).
See FLA. STAT. § 73.131(2) (1993).
Skinners Wholesale Nursery, Inc., 736 So. 2d at 8-9.

53.

Id. at 9.

54.

724 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 732 So. 2d 328 (Fla.

55.
56.
57.

Id. at 645.
Id.
See id. at 645-66.

50.

1999).

58. Id. at 646. Section 73.131(2) of the FloridaStatutes provides that "[t]he petitioner
[condemning authority] shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the appellate court,
including a reasonable attorneys' fee to be assessed by that court, except upon an appeal taken by
a defendant [condemnee] in which the judgment of the lower court shall be affirmed." RLA.
STAT. § 73.131(2) (1999).
59.

Boyle Inv. Co., 724 So. 2d at 646.

1999]
B.
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Landlordand Tenant

Florida RS, Inc. v. Nelson.6 0 The tenant brought suit claiming the
landlord had breached the lease by, inter alia, failing to pay interest on an
annual basis as required by statute.w1 The court rejected the tenant's motion
for certification of a class action, but the tenant prevailed on his original
claim and was awarded $30.70 interest on his security deposit. 62 The court
then awarded the tenant, an attorney who represented himself with the aid of
another lawyer, attorneys' fees of $27,654.6
The district court reversed.64 By statute, attorneys' fees could be
65
recovered by the prevailing party in litigation concerning a residential lease.
However, the district court concluded that the tenant had not prevailed on the
attempt to have the class certified.6 Therefore, the tenant was not entitled to
attorneys' fees involved with that attempt. 67 The tenant was entitled to
attorneys' fees for claims on which he prevailed that included
68 only the
attorney's time spent on recovering interest on his security deposit.

I. BROKERS
A.

Discipline andLicensing

Starr v. Department of Business & Professional Regulation.6 9 In
completing her application for a license, Starr failed to reveal that she had.
pled no contest to two separate misdemeanor charges, i.e., disorderly
intoxication and disorderly conduct.70 When that was discovered, the
Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("DBPR") revoked her
license. 71 On appeal, she challenged the Department's right to inquire about
criminal conduct not a felony and not related to real estate transactions.7 2
The district court summarily rejected that claim and any argument
challenging the license revocation as being different from sanctions given to
60.
61.
62.
63.

24 Fla. L. Weekly D57 (5th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998).
Id. at D57; FA. STAT. § 83.49(9) (1995).
Nelson, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D57-58.
Id. at D57.

64.

Id. at D58.

65.
66.
67.

FLA. STAT. § 83.48 (1995).
Nelson, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D58.
Id. at D58-59.

68. Id.
69. 729 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
70. Id. at 1006.
71. Id.
72.

Id.
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others for similar
offenses or as being beyond the authority of the
73
Department.
White v. Department of Business & ProfessionalRegulation.7 4 White
was both a broker and a building contractor. Buyers agreed to buy a lot in
Whisper Ridge Subdivision on which the broker would build their house.76
The purchase contract provided that the deposit would be held in escrow by
Les White Realty/Builders.77 However, the deposit was never put in the
escrow. 78 White used the money to buy the lot in his own name.7 9 Then
White's construction financing disappeared, so the house was never built
and the lot never sold to the buyers. 0 White, however, refused to return
their deposit. 81 When the DBPR began disciplinary proceedings, White's
defense was that he acted only as a builder in this 82transaction, not as a
broker, so the DBPR had no basis for disciplining him.
The Real Estate Commission found otherwise and revoked his broker's
license. 83 The record revealed that, throughout the transaction, White had
represented himself as a licensed real estate broker.84 The purchase contract
indicated that White was acting as a broker and that the deposit would be
held in escrow by his realty company. 85 "Although the evidence at the
hearing disclosed White wore several 'hats' in this transaction, it supports
the Commission's conclusion that one of the hats worn was that of a licensed
real estate broker., 86 In that role, White had breached his statutory duties to
properly escrow the deposit money and return the deposit.87 In light of the
fact that White's license was already suspended at the time of this
transaction, the Commission was justified in revoking his license.8 8

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 1006-07.
715 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 1130.
Id.
Id.
Id.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

White, 715 So.2d at 1130.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 1131.
Id.
at 1130.
White, 715 So.2d at 1130.
Id. at 1130-31.
Id. at 1131.
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1)(d) (1999).
White, 715 So. 2d at 1131.

87.

88.

Brown/Grohman
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BrokerageAgreements and Commissions

A.F.S. Services, Inc. v. Venturvest Realty Corp.8 9 Under the brokerage
agreement, the broker (actually a co-broker in this situation) would earn the
first half of its commission within thirty days after execution of the lease and
the second half thirty days after the first month's rent had been collected. 90 A
commercial tenant was procured. 91 The tenant signed the lease and paid a
deposit covering security and prepaid rent.92 However, eleven days later, the
landlord and tenant signed a "Second Lease Addendum," increasing the
premises by approximately fifty percent.93 Eventually, the tenant defaulted
on its obligations under the amended lease.94
The broker claimed that it was entitled to its commission because it had
fully performed.95 The landlord, however, pointed out that the lease also
provided that, "[n]o commission shall be earned by Broker in the event of a
monetary default by Tenant." 96 With the terms apparently in conflict, the
trial court ruled for the landlord, but the district court reversed the decision
in party. It ruled that the broker had earned the first half of the commission
based upon the lease signing and the second half based upon the payment of
the first month's rent. The court concluded simply, "default under the
Second Lease Addendum does not in any way affect A.F.S.'s entitlement to
the commission that it had already earned." 99
Earnest & Stewart, Inc. v. Codina.1°° The sellers had an exclusive
listing agreement with a broker.101 Under that listing agreement, the broker
could pay a portion of its commission to a cooperating broker.1 2 Another
broker, Earnest & Stewart, was aware that the house was for sale.1°3 One of
its sales people informed the Coneses of that fact and offered to show them
the house.1
The Coneses refused that offer because they were already
89.
90.

725 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (Mar. 10, 1999).
Id. at 1253.

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. A.F.S. Servs., Inc., 725 So. 2d at 1253.

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1252.
98. Id. at 1253.
99. A.F.S. Servs., Inc., 725 So. 2d at 1253.
100. 732 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (Mar. 24, 1999).

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 365.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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familiar with the house and knew the sellers. °5 The Coneses dealt directly
with the sellers in negotiating the deal which culminated with the sale of the
house to the ConesesY16 Honoring their listing agreement, the sellers paid
the real estate commission to their exclusive broker.
Earnest & Stewart,
however, claimed that they were also
0 8 entitled to a real estate commission
because they had procured the buyer.
Earnest & Stewart's claim was rejected by the trial court which granted
summary judgment to the buyers and sellers and the Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed.1 9 The claim was based on the theory that Earnest &
Stewart had become the cooperating brokers and were entitled, as third party
beneficiaries of the listing agreement, to share in the commission. 11° The
district court concluded they had produced a ready, willing and able buyer
and, therefore, had not become cooperating brokers."' Thus they had not
earned a broker's commission 2 The court likened it to the situation where
a broker merely tells a customer about a "For Sale" sign it has seen on the
lawn of a property.1 3
That alone is not enough to earn a
commission! The court did not, however, address the validity of the
plaintiff's third party beneficiary theory. Furthermore, it specifically
avoided dealing with the question of whether the broker, even if the theory
had been valid, was entitled to sue the sellers and buyers, rather than the
listing broker, for its share of the commission.
IV. CONDOMINIUMS

Graves v. Ciega Verde Condominium Ass'n, Inc.115 Nancy Graves, the
personal representative to Fred Graves' estate, appealed the trial court's nonfinal order vacating an amended final judgment of foreclosure and canceling
judicial sale against Ciega Verde Condominium Association, Inc. ("Ciega
Verde"? and its unit owners in this foreclosure and construction lien
action.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Earnest & Stewart, Inc., 732 So. 2d at 365.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 365-67.
Earnest & Stewart, Inc., 732 So. 2d at 365 n.2.
Id. at 365-66.
Id. at 366.
Id.
Id.
703 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id.at I110.

1999]
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Decedent, Fred Graves, as a general contractor, performed repair work
to the condominiums pursuant to a contract.11 7 Ciega Verde later refused to
pay Graves for his services and denied Graves access to the property. 1
Graves served a claim of lien and a contractor's affidavit.119 Subsequently,
Graves filed an amended complaint which sought to foreclose the
mechanic's lien against the unit owners and sought recovery of damages for.
breach of contract against Ciega Verde. 12° Graves sued the unit owners as a
defendant class with Ciega Verde as class representative.12 1 Ciega Verde, in
its individual capacity and as representative of the class, answered the
amended complaint.'
The contract portion of the complaint was set for binding arbitration
where Graves was the prevailing party.'23 "Graves served Ciega Verde with
a motion to confirm the arbitration award and to set cause for trial on the
foreclosure action against the unit owners."' 124 "[T]he trial court entered
5
final judgment in March 1996 .... and set [judicial] sale for May 1996."'1
Counsel for unit owners "filed a motion to set aside the amended final
judgment... [claiming] the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order
foreclosure of the unit owners' property."' 26 Ultimately, the trial court
granted the unit owners' motion to dismiss and dismissed them from the
action 2 7 Since Graves failed to serve such unit owners "within 120 days
from filing the original complaint as required by Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure &ule] 1.170(l) [sic]," he was precluded from filing the original
complaint.
The district court recognized that the trial court erred in vacating the
amended final judgment of foreclosure. 29 The trial court had jurisdiction of
a class with a common interest
the unit owners because they constituted
30
based on membership in Ciega Verde.
Ciega Verde's Declaration of Condominium stated that each unit owner
131
was a member of the condominium association while they owned the unit.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
It
Id.
Graves,703 So. 2d at 1110.

121. Id. at 1111.

122. Id.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

1d.
Id.
Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1111.
let
Id.
Id.
Id.

130. Graves,703 So. 2d at 1111; see FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.221.
131. Graves,703 So. 2d at 1111.
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When Ciega Verde authorized work to be performed on the common
grounds, it was understood that the unit owners consented to that
authorization. 132 As33such, Graves' lien attached to each condo unit and
could be foreclosed.1
Each unit owner was not required to receive individual notice. 134 It was
the condominium's board of directors' fiduciary and statutory obligation to
give unit owners notice of a lawsuit. 135 Graves' service upon Ciega Verde,
the class representative, was sufficient. 36 If the court wanted to require
notice to the individual members, it should have provided Graves adequate
time to do So.137
Perlow v. Goldberg 38 This court affirmed the order dismissing
owner's claims because the facts showed the directors could not be held
liable in their individual capacity. 39 Perlow sought personal judgments for
breach of fiduciary duty against Goldberg and Leb for "failure to properly
administer insurance proceeds." 14
The condominium association directors were immune from individual
liability absent fraud, self-dealing, or criminal activity.' 4 1 The court below
relied on Munder v. Circle One Condominium, Inc., which furthered this
rule. 43 This court agreed with that holding and stated the directors here
were neither unjustly enriched nor did they commit fraud or a crime. 44 At
most, the directors were negligent by failing to properly administrate
insurance proceeds from Hurricane Andrew."4 - This negligence46 was not
enough to create personal liability for the condominium directors1
The court also recognized that the owner's reliance on B & J Holding
because the directors in that 149case
Group v. Weiss147 was unwarranted
48
deliberately engaged in self-dealing.1 That was not the situation here.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 1112.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1112.
Id.
700 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.App.1997).
Id.at 149.
Id.
Id.; see FLA. STAT. §§ 607.0831(1),617.0834,718.111(2) (1995).
596 So.2d 144 (Fa.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
Perlow, 700 So. 2d at 150.
Id.
Id.
Id.
353 So. 2d 141 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App.1977).
Perlow, 700 So. 2d at 150; see B &J Holding Corp., 353 So. 2d at 142.
Perlow, 700 So. 2d at 150.

Brown/Grohman

1999]

Ruffin v. Kingswood E. Condominium Ass'n, Inc.150 Kingswood E.
Condominium Association ("Kingswood") brought an arbitration proceeding
under section 718.1255 of the Florida Statutes, against unit owner Mary
Ruffm and her son, appellant Paul Ruffm.15 1 The reason for the arbitration
was that Kingswood alleged that Mary Ruffin and the appellant were in
violation of the condominium declarations.15 2 Kingswood requested the
Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominium and Mobiles Homes of the
Department of Business Regulation to issue an order requiring appellant as
tenant to vacate the premises and restrain him from further entry.153 The
appellant informed "the arbitrator that his mother had moved... and
therefore, the matter was moot."1 54 However, Kingswood wanted future
protection. So, the arbitrator issued an order that "Mr. Ruffm shall remain
away and off the condominium property. '5 5
The appellant filed a complaint for a trial de novo in circuit court and
Kingswood moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the case was
moot. 56 The circuit court entered the summary judgment and reserved
jurisdiction to assess attorneys' fees.157
The appellate court, sua sponte, considered the subject matter
jurisdiction of the arbitrator to have heard this action.15 The court looked at
59
section 718.1255(1) of the Florida Statutes,"
and found that the arbitrator
had no subject matter jurisdiction. 16 The arbitrator may only hear disputes
within its statutory authority and disputes that include disagreements
involving eviction or other removal are not within the arbitrator's statutory
authority. 161 Further, the appellant was not the owner of the unit
62 and,
therefore, section 718.1255 did not cover disputes with the appellant.
Since the arbitrator lacked subject matter jurisdiction the trial de novo
6
was
not moot.
If the
had 164
notTherefore,
challengedthisthecourt
matter,
the
arbitrator's
order would
haveappellant
become final.
reversed
150.
151.
152.
153.

719 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 952; See FLA. STAT. § 718.1255 (1995).
Ruffin, 719 So. 2d at 952.
Id.

154. Id.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Ruffin, 719 So. 2d at 952.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(1) (1995).
Ruffin, 719 So. 2d at 953.
See id.
See id.; See Carlandia Corp. v. Obemauer, 695 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct.

App. 1997).
163. Ruffin, 719 So. 2d at 953.
164. Id.
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the final judgment and 1directed
the trial court to enter an order vacating the
65
arbitrator's final order.
Current legislative changes include, but are not limited to, the
following:
Section 718.111(11)(d) of the Florida Statutes'6 6 now includes
subparagraph (d) which provides for the association to "maintain adequate
insurance or fidelity
167 bonding of all persons who control or disburse funds of
the association."
Section 718.112(d)(8) of the Florida Statutes168 provides that, unless
the bylaws provide otherwise, any vacancy on the board of directors of the
association prior to the expiration of a term may be filled by a majority vote
of the remaining directors even though they may constitute less than a
quorum or by the sole remaining director.' 6 Alternatively, however, the
board may hold an election to fill the vacancy. 70
Section 718.503(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes'7' has been amended to
require that a unit owner who is not a developer shall include a copy of the
financial information required by section 718.111 in the disclosure
information presented to a prospective purchaser. 72 Likewise, a prospectus
or offering circular, per section 718.504'73
of the FloridaStatutes, requires
the same information to be included. 174
V. CONSTRUCTION

Gaston-Thacker General Partners v. School Board.175 The plaintiff
was the successful bidder on a school construction project. 176 The contract
required that a certain percentage of the subcontract work be allocated to
firms owned by hispanics, blacks, and women.17 ' To make it possible for the
plaintiff to satisfy that requirement, the school board agreed to make biweekly progress payments to under financed subcontractors.
As the
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
FLA. STAT § 718.111(11)(d) (1999).

Id.
Id. § 718.112(d)(8).
Id.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 718.503(2)(a) (1999).
Id.
Id. § 718.504.
Id.
12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D381 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 1999).
Id. at D381.
Id.
Id. at D382.
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project progressed, "it allegedly became clear to both parties that the
drawings, specifications, and addenda were flawed and could not be used for
the Project." 179 That resulted in extra work for plaintiff and in delays in the
progress payments to the subcontractors. 180 To keep them workinAl plaintiff
was forced to make their progress payments out of its funds. 1 When
payment was not forthcoming from the school board, the plaintiff brought
this suit in federal district court claiming: 1) breach of contract; 2)
rescission and restitution; and 3) quantum meruit.182 The school board
responded with a motion to dismiss based on the clause in the contract that
provided that, "[a]ll matters in dispute under this Contract and/or the
Contract Documents shall be resolved in the Circuit Court for the 11th
Judicial Circuit, In and For Dade County, Florida. 183 There was no doubt
that a forum selection clause can preclude removal of a claim to a federal
court.184 Furthermore, there was no allegation that this forum selection clause
was unreasonable or unjust, or that it had been procured by fraud or
overreaching.18 5 Nor was there an allegation that the clause failed to
unequivocally state the selected forum. 8 6 Thus, there was no claim on which
the clause could have been held invalid. 187 Plaintiff's argument was that its
claims did not fit within
88 reach of the clause and so it was free to bring these
claims in federal court.
That argument was rejected by Chief Judge Davis. 189 Even though the
moving party had a heavy burden, the plaintiff could not survive the motion to
dismiss merely by arguing that these claims did not arise under the contract. 19°
Analysis of the term led to the contrary conclusion. 91 To interpret the contract
as plaintiff wanted would allow parallel claims to be litigated simultaneously
in state and federal court, and that could not have been what the parties
intended by this clause, particularly as the contract was the only basis for the
relationship out of which these claims arose. 192

179. Id.
180. Gaston-ThackerGen. Partners,12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at D382.
181. Id.
182. Id.

183. Id.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See id.
Gaston-ThackerGen. Partners,12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at D382.
Id.
Id.
Id. atD382-83.

189. Id.
190. Gaston-ThackerGen. Partners,12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at D382-83.
191. Id. at 383.
192. Id.
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Sabal Chase Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Walt Disney World Co. 193 The
condominium was built between 1973 and 1978.194 In 1992, Hurricane
Andrew severely damaged the common areas.' 95 Consequently, in 1994, the
Homeowners' Association brought this action against, inter alia,the builder of
the condominium, claiming latent construction defects. 19 6 The trial court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the fifteen
r
year statute of repose provided by
sectionaffirmed.,
95.11(3)c)
of the Florida
Court of Appeal
97
Statutes.' The Third District
On appeal, the homeowners association unsuccessfully raised two
points. 199 The first was that the statute was inapplicable because it was
enacted in 1980, after the acts complained of had occurred. 2 ° The statute had
originally been enacted in 1978, before the construction was completed, but
the enactment was held invalid because the legislature had failed to make an
express finding of overwhelming public necessity as required by the
constitution. 20 ' The legislature cured that defect by reenacting the statute with
an express finding, having the effect that "all parts of the original
' 2 statute which
were reenacted are deemed to have been in continuous effect.
The second point was that the fifteen years had not expired because the
time did not begin to run until the developer turned over control of the
association to the unit owners. M 3 This argument was based on section
718.124 of the Florida Statutes which provides that, "[t]he statute of
limitations for any actions in law or equity which a condominium association
or a cooperative association may have shall not begin to run until the unit
owners have elected a majority of the members of the board of
administration." 2°4 The district court rejected this argument. 2 05 It noted that
courts have clearly delineated the distinction between a statute of limitation
and a statute of repose. 206 The fifteen year statute at issue here was clearly a

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

726 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (Mar. 24, 1999).
Id. at 797.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (Supp. 1980)).
Sabal ChaseHomeowners'Ass'n, 726 So. 2d at 799.
Id. at 798.
Id. at 797-98.
Id. at 799 (citing Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979)).
Id. at 799.
Sabal Chase Homeowners'Ass'n, 726 So. 2d at 798.
Id. at 798 n.1 (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.124 (1995)).
Id. at 799.
Id. at 798.
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statute of rqpose, therefore, section 718.124 was not applicable to delay its
application.
Judge Cope's dissent focused on the distinction of the statute 2of
limitations and the statute of repose considered in the majority's opinion. 08
Judge Cope disliked the fact that the term statute of limitations is technically
distinguishable from a "statute of repose," but has been used generically to
include all statutes that impose time limits for bringing suit.m9 The Florida
Legislature seems to use the generic definition by including this statute of
repose in chapter ninety-five under the general term "statute of limitations. 210
Ininterpreting a statute, the critical question is what the legislature intended. 1
Furthermore, any doubt regarding the limit intended by the legislature, should
be resolved
2 12 in favor of the longer period because limitations defenses are not
preferred.
VI. COOPERATIVES
Current legislative changes include, but are not limited to, the
following:
Section 719.103 of the FloridaStatutes has added additional definitions
including those for "buyers," "common areas," and "conspicuous type. '213 A
"buyer" is one "who purchases a cooperative," and the words "purchaser"
and "buyer" may be ised interchangeably within the act.21 4 "Common areas"
now include, among other things, cooperative property which is not included
within the units.21 "Conspicuous type" means typing capital letters not
smaller than the largest type on the page on which it appears.2 16 Also, there
common areas," "rental
are additional definitions for "division," 21"limited
7
agreement," and "residential cooperative.
Section 719.1035 of the Florida Statutes has been amended to require
that, upon creating a cooperative, the developer or association must record
with the division, on a division form, within thirty working
the information
21 8
days.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 799.
dissenting).
Sabal Chase Homeowners' Ass'n, 726 So. 2d at 799-801 (Cope, J.,
Id. at 800.
Id.at 801.
Id. at 800-01.
Id. at 801.
FLA. STAT. § 719.103 (1999).
Id. § 719.103(4).
Id. §§ 719.103(7), (8)(a).
Id. § 719.103(11).
Id. §§ 719.103(17), (18), (20), (21).
FLA. STAT. § 719.1035 (1999).
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Section 719.104 of the Florida Statutes now includes subpart (10),
requiring the board to notify the division before an' action is taken that
would dissolve or merge the cooperative association.
Section 719.502(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes now includes a provision
that states:
[a] developer shall not close on any contract for sale or contract for
a lease period of more than 5 years until the developer prepares and
files with the division documents complying with the requirements
of this chapter and the rules promulgated by the division 22and until
the division notifies the developer that the filing is proper. 0
Further, any contract for sale or for a lease period of more than five years
shall not be closed on by the developer until all documents, as required by
section 719.503(1)Sb), are prepared and delivered by the developer to the
prospective buyer.
Section 719.503(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes has an added provision
requiring that:
[t]he developer shall not close for 15 days following the
execution of the agreement and delivery of the documents to the
buyer as evidenced by a receipt for documents signed by the buyer
unless the buyer is informed in the 15-day voidabilty period and
agrees to close prior to the expiration of the 15 days.
The developer must keep in its records "a separate signed agreement as proof
of the buyer's agreement to close prior to the expiration of the voidability
period."2
Section seven of Chapter 99-350 of the Laws of Florida adds section
718.105(5) to the 1999 Florida Statutes, reguiring the filing of a certificate
demonstrating all taxes have been fully paid. T2

219. Id. § 719.104(10).
220. Id. § 719.502(1)(a).

221. Id.
222. Id. § 719.503(1)(b).
223. FLA. STAT. § 719.503(1)(b) (1999).
224. Ch. 99-350, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws 3589, 3589 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 718.105(5)
(1999)).
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VII. DEEDS, RESTRICTIONS, AND COVENANTS

Mora v. Karr.225 The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the
temporary ijunction to the Moras, regarding a violation of deed
restrictions.
Karr wished to purchase a home and rebuild so that it would
contain "a three car garage and a twenty five foot setback." 2 7 However,
deed restrictions only allowed a two car garage and required a thirty-five
foot setback.m
Karr secured a waiver to those restrictions from the
developer and from adjacent property owners prior to the purchase. 2 9 After
closing, Mr. Mora, an adjacent property owner and attorney, wrote Karr a
letter stating that he would sue over the deed restrictions he waived. 0 Karr
continued with construction, and Mora sued.2 1
z2
Both the trial court, and this court, denied injunctive relief to Mora.
The most compelling evidence was the fact that Mora waived the deed
restrictions prior to the
construction, and that Karr relied on that waiver in
33
making the purchase.2

VIII. EASEMENTS
Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Florida East Coast Railway CoY'4 Final
judgment was entered which quieted title to certain property in favor of
Florida East Coast Railway Company ("FEC").235 The appellate court
reversed, finding that "Citgo was granted an express easement to construct
and maintain a pipeline on the subject property... and that Citgo's failure to
record this easement does not render ''it36 ineffectual against FEC since FEC
was on inquiry notice of its existence. 2
The events giving rise to this dispute involved the expansion of the Fort
Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport and the resulting utilities
relocation. 7 Citgo's licensing contract with FEC provided them with the
"right and privilege" to operate a pipeline under FEC's main track, and
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

697 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id at 888.
Id.
Id.
L
Mora, 697 So. 2d at 888.
Ma
Id.
IM.
706 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 384.
Id.
Id.
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across their right-of-way. 238 FEC's right-of-way and Citgo's pipeline both
had to be repositioned when the airport was expanded.239 Citgo and
Florida's Department of Transportation ("DOT") agreed to reestablish the
pipeline. 2 0 The stipulated agreement stated that property rights along the
original pipeline belonged to Citgo. It also provided that Citgo transfer those
property rights to the DOT in exchange for allowing Citgo to reposition and
operate the pipeline on other DOT property. 24'
Citgo informed FEC that the pipeline was to be reestablished across the
FEC sent Citgo the
proposed relocation of FEC's right-of-way. 24 2
appropriate engineering specifications, as well as an application for a new
licensing agreement.2A FEC remained adamant that, until it reached an
agreement with Broward County to reposition its rigt-of-way, it was unable
to consider granting Citgo a utility crossing permit.
FEC and Broward County eventually "reached an agreement with
Broward County to relocate the railroad track." 24 5 That agreement provided
that FEC would transfer its existing right-of-way, and in exchange retrieve a
replacement right-of-way to Broward County. 24 6 The parcels of land
comprising the new right-of-way were transferred to FEC, which promptly
247
Citgo did not maintain any easements on
recorded the quitclaim deed.
record regarding this property.24 s
The new right-of-way was to be transferred to FEC "free and clear of
all encumbrances."2 49 However, FEC was required to "grant easements,
licenses, and permits to various utility companies.., to allow storm sewers,
fuel lines, and other appurtenances to cross the new right-of-way." 2 0 No
mention was made of the relocated Citgo pipeline.2 1
FEC sent Citgo an additional application for a licensin agreement.
After FEC's
As before, this licensing agreement was never executed.
railroad tracks and Citgo's pipeline were fully completed, it was evident that
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 384.
Id.
Id.
Id.

243. Id.
244. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 384.
245. Id.

246. Id.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id.
Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 384.
Id.
Id. at 385.
Id.
Id.
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4
the railroad track was built between two of the
5 pipeline's protruding vents
titleY
quiet
to
suit
In response, FEC brought
Citgo argued that it had an express easement due to the earlier
agreement with the DOT.' After the proceedings began, Citgo recorded a
Notice of Easement. 2 7 The court concluded that FEC was not on inquiry
notice of any "potential unrecorded easement," that Citgo was never ranted
an easement, and that Citgo's Notice of Easement was null and void. Citgo
appealed the court's final judgment.2 5 9
Under de novo review, the appellate court was convinced that the 1983
Agreement granted Ci o an express easement to operate and preserve the
The court stated that "'[ain easement is the right in
reestablished pipeline.
one other than the owner of the land to use land for some particular purpose
or purposes.1'126 The applicable rule to determine whether the agreement
did in fact grant Citgo an easement, is that "'no particular form and language
are necessary to create an easement; rather, any words clearly showing the
intention of the parties to create a servitude on a sufficiently identifiable

estate is sufficient."' 262 No provision in the 1983 Agreement affirmatively
established that an easement was not intended.2 63 In fact, the court found the

DOT manifested an intent to
4 grant Citgo an easement based on other

provisions in the agreement.2
The court also rejected FEC's argument that the easement was
ineffectual against FEC because of Citgo's failure to record it.265 In Florida,

the recording act subjects FEC to Citgo's ore-existing, unrecorded easement,
unless FEC was "without notice" of it.26P "If the circumstances known to

FEC when it acquired the subject property were 'such as should reasonably
suggest inquiry' into Citgo's property rights, then FEC is deemed to be on
'inquiry notice' of-and bound by-those encumbrances which would have

254. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 385.

255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 385.
260. Id.
261. Id. (quoting Dean v. MOD Properties, Ltd., 528 So. 2d 432,433 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1988)).
262. Id. (quoting Hynes v. City of Lakeland, 451 So. 2d 505, 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1984)).
263. Id.
264. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 385.
265. Id.
266. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 695.01(2) (1995).
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been discovered upon a reasonable inquiry." 2 This court concluded that
"Citgo's actual, open, and obvious possession by construction of a
conspicuous pipeline placed FEC on inquiry notice of Citgo's easement."2'68
H & F Land, Inc. v. Panama City-Bay County Airport & Industrial
District.269 The issue before the court was "whether the Marketable Record
Title Act (hereinafter MRTA) Chapter 712, of the Florida Statutes, operates
to extinguish an otherwise valid claim of an easement of necessity, when
such a270claim has not been asserted within 30 years, as required by [the
Act]."
The appellate court recognized the general rule that a "landowner has a
right to access his land."2 71 However, it disagreed with H & F, the owner of
a landlocked estate, that its claim deserved different treatment from any
other claim of an interest in land which did not fall within an exception to
the MRTA, and which had not been asserted in a timely matter.272
The MRTA was devised to streamline conveyances of real property,
balance titles, and provide assurance to land ownership. 273 A party can only
blame himself if he fails to provide proper notice. 274 The legislature
intended to afford a means to preserve old claims and interests, and to give a
reasonable time period to take steps to accomplish the purpose. 275
Since the policies underlying the MRTA conflict with the public policy
that "lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy or cultivation," the
court certified a question of great public importance:
DOES THE MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT, CHAPTER
712, FLORIDA STATUTES, OPERATE TO EXTINGUISH AN
OTHERWISE VALID CLAIM OF A COMMON LAW WAY OF
NECESSITY WHEN SUCH CLAIM WAS NOT ASSERTED
WITHIN 30 YEARS?276

267.
1957)).
268.
269.
270.
271.
1981).
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 386 (citing Chatlos v. McPherson, 95 So. 2d 506, 509 (Fla.
Id.
706 So. 2d 327 (Ba.1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 327.
Id.; see Roy v. Euro-Holland Vastgoed, 404 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
H & F Land,Inc., 706 So. 2d at 328.
Id. (citing City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So. 2d 439,444 (Fla. 1978)).
IM
IM
Id
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Highland Constuction, Inc. v. Paquette.2 7 This court affirmed final
judgment granting Paquette an implied easement over Highland's
property. Paquette sued Highland requesting an implied easement be
granted over Vickers Street.279 Once Vickers Street was abandoned,
ownership reverted to Highland. 280
With regard to determining the existence of an implied easement,
Florida adopted the "beneficial" or "complete enjoyment rule."281 This rule
states that.the grantee acquires the right to all streets in the plat advantageous
to him. 2 If the grantee can show he will suffer injury, differing in degree
and kind from everyone else, he is authorized to acquire an implied
easement. 2 3 Paquette satisfied the beneficial enjoyment rule.2 4 Since they
operate two car businesses on their property, and Vickers Street was the only
viable entrance to these establishments, the loss of this access would impair
the business. 285 As such, the implied easement was granted. 8 6
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FranchiseFinance Corp. of America. 8 This
court reversed a final summary judgment that "declared a condition in a
nonexclusive easement unenforceable and void.' ' 8 Sears owns real property
where it operates a retail store, adjacent to a retail shopping center owned by
Bradenton Mall Associates ("Developer"). 289 Sears and Developer managed
their parcels under a joint Operating Agreement because they had adjacent
parcels and parking lots that were connected. 2 9 Southern Homes Park, Inc.
("Southern"), a corporate affiliate of Developer, owned an "outparcel"
adjacent to the others but only accessible through the Sears parking lot.291 In
1987, Southern sold its outparcel to Suncoast Rax, Inc. ("Suncoast"), on the
condition that Southern acquired an ingress and egress easement to the
"outparcel" over a section of the Sears parking lot.
At the same time,
Suncoast, was contracting to sell the "outparcel' and easement, if acquired,
277. 697 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1997).
278. 1&at236.

279. Id.
280. Id
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id.
Paquette,697 So. 2d at 236.
Id
Id. at 237.
I&
Id.
711 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 1190.
Id.

290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Sears,711 So. 2d at 1190.
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to the appellee, Franchise Finance Corporation of America ("F.F.C.A."). 293
294
However, F.F.C.A. agreed to lease the property back to Suncoast.
Developer and Sears agreed that Sears would grant the easement to
Suncoast, and Developer, in return, would sweep both the Developer parking
area and the Sears entire parking area. The easement provided:
The rights granted herein shall be perpetual, but shall expire in
the event that:
(iii) Developer... shall fail to sweep that portion of Grantor's
parcel devoted to customer parking and which includes the
Easement Parcel ("Parking Parcel") as shown in yellow on Exhibit
C hereto. Grantor, its employees, agents or contractors shall upon
written notice to both Developer and Grantee, have the right, at its
cost and expense, to sweep the Parking Parcel. In the event that
after notice Developer and/or Grantee fails to or refuses to cure,
Grantor shall have the right to terminate the easements granted
herein by filing a Notice of Termination of Easement in the Public
Records of Manatee County, Florida, thirty (30) days, after written
296
notice to both Grantee and Bradenton.
In 1990, Suncoast went out of business and F.F.C.A. terminated the
lease. 297 In November, 1992, Developer sent F.F.C.A. an invoice for the
annual cost of sweeping the Sears parking area.298 Developer notified
F.F.C.A. that if the invoice was not paid, the Developer would cease
sweeping the Sears parking area.299 F.F.C.A. refused to pay the invoice, and
fearing that Sears may want to terminate the easement, brought its
declaratory action to have the "sweeping" condition proclaimed void and
unenforceable. 300
The trial court declared the forfeiture provision
unenforceable under section 689.18 of the Florida Statutes because it
provides that "reverter or forfeiture provisions of unlimited duration in the
conveyance of real estate or any interest therein in the state constitute an
unreasonable restraint on alienation and are contrary to the public policy of
the state."3 '
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

297. Sears, 711 So. 2d at 1190.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1191.
300. Id.

301. Id.; FLA.

STAT.

§ 689.18 (1999).
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The appellate court rejected this argument, because a grant of easement
is not a conveyance of a proprietary interest in real property."° An easement
only grants the right to use property for some particular purpose, and does
not transfer title to land or disinherit the owner of the land subject to
easement. 303 Therefore, this court concluded that "a specified condition to
the continuance of an easement agreed upon by the parties... isnot an
encumbrance to the marketability of title to real estate" which is meant to be
protected by section 689.18 of the FloridaStatutes.304 Easements that cease
upon the occurrence of a clearly defined condition have been recognized in
the past. °5
Furthermore this court found it was an error of the trial court to apply
section 689.18. 3 Even if it did apply, the forfeiture provision would only
become void twenty-one years after the granting of the easement, because
section 689.18 (3) and (4) provide that the provisions do not become void
until twenty-one years after the conveyance has passed. °7
Shiner v. Baita.318 Shiner sought to terminate a real property right
reserved by Baita through a deed given by Baita to Shiner's predecessor in
interest.3°9 A reservation was placed in the deed by Baita, the original
grantor of the property which stated:
Grantors reserve to themselves, their heirs and assigns the right to a
hook-up to septic tank located on the land herein conveyed, said
septic tank being located to the Southeast of the acre being retained
by the Grantors herein with the understanding that responsibility of
maintaining said septic tank shall remain with the Grantors, their
heirs and assigns, and for purposes of maintenance the Grantors,
their heirs and assigns, shall have the right to ingress and egress to
maintain said septic tank. It is understood this reservation of use of
the septic tank is to continue indefinitely but that should Grantee,
his successors or assigns determine later that connection to septic
tank interferes with use of property herein conveyed, Grantee, his
successors or assigns shall have the right to pay expenses necessary
to construct a septic tank on the premises which are herein reserved

302. Sears,711 So. 2d at 1191.
303. Id.; see Easton v. Appler, 548 So. 2d 691,696 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1989); see also
Dean v. MOD Properties, Ltd., 528 So. 2d 432,433 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
304. Sears, 711 So. 2d at 1191.

305. Id.; see Dotson v. Wolfe, 391 So. 2d 757,759 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1980).
306.
307.
308.
309.

Sears, 711 So. 2d at 1192.
Id. (citing EtR.STAT. §§ 689.18(3), (4) (1987)).
710 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1998).
Id. at 711.
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by the Grantors, and then in that event, this right of hook-up
to
310
septic tank shall cease and be of no further force and effect.
Shiner elected to construct a septic tank on the property still held by
Baita, because she believed she had the right to do so after acquiring the
property. 311 Shiner felt that this action would end the reserved right for
Baita's septic tank hook up. 312 Baita, who intended to develop a mobile
home park, disputed Shiner's view.313
The lower court found the restrictive covenant to be ambiguous, and
Shiner's septic tank would deprive Baita of using her property. 314 Therefore,
the lower court held that Shiner could not take any action regarding the
septic tank that would deprive Baita from using and enjoying herproperty. 1 5
The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision.
First, the
court found that a restrictive covenant did not exist.317 Rather, a reservation
318
existed and that the deed created an easement, not a restrictive covenant.
Although an easement is often permanent, it319does not have to be, and may in
fact end upon the happening of a condition.
When there is a grant of easement, "'[t]he intent of the parties... is
determined by a fair interpretation of the language."'' 320 When the language
is unambiguous, the court must look at the plain meaning.321 This court
found that there was no ambiguity in the language of the deed, and it clearly
shows that if the grantee determines that the septic tank interferes with their
use of the property, they may construct a septic tank on the property and the
hook-up septic tank shall cease. 322 Therefore, because "'[tihe easement
holder cannot expand the easement beyond what was contemplated at the

310. Id. at 711-12.
311. Id. at 712.
312. Id.
313. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 712.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 713.
317. Id. at 712.
318. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 712; see Homer v. Dadeland Shopping Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d
834, 836 (Fla. 1969).
319. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 712; see Dotson v. Wolfe, 391 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1980).
320. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 712 (quoting Walters v. McCall, 450 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
321. Id. at 712; see Richardson v. Deerwood Club, Inc., 589 So. 2d 937, 939 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
322. Shiner,710 So. 2d at 712.
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time it was granted, ' ''3 3 the appellate court held that the appellant is
permitted to enforce the unambiguous provisions and reversed the lower
court's order.324
IX. ELECrIVE SHARE
Chapter 99-343 of the Laws of Florida provides numerous changes to
section 732 of the FloridaStatutes, including, but not limited to, expanding
3 the elective share right to various assets not included in the probate estate.

X. EMINENT DOMAIN
A.

Condemnation
1. In General

Buried in 1999 Fla. Laws. ch 385, a huge act relating to the DOT,326 are
some significant changes to the eminent domain statutes. 327 The most
important changes are that section 73.015(1) of the Florida Statutes will
require every condemner to: 1) provide the landowner with notice by
certified mail of the planned taking; 2) make a written offer to buy the land;
and 3) negotiate in good faith before filing the condemnation
petition.
The condemner is also required to notify the owners of
businesses located on the land. 329 The condemner will no longer be allowed
to take an entire property when that is not needed for the condemner's
project, but taking the whole would be cheaper because that approach would
avoid having to pay business damages.330 Section 73.015(4) of the Florida
Statutes will provide for attorneys' fees and costs when the parties reach

323. Id. at 712-13 (quoting Walters v. McCall, 450 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1984)); Fields v. Nichols, 482 So. 2d 410,414 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
324. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 713.
325. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-343 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 732 (1999)).
326. Under article III, section 5 of the Florida Constitution, a legislative act is limited
to one subject. If this act satisfies the one subject rule, then the rule is entirely meaningless.
327. For further discussion see Bain, supra,note 4, at 68.
328. Ch. 99-385, § 57(1), 1999 Fla. Laws 3820, 3823 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.23
(1999)).
329. Id. § 57(2), 1999 Fla. Laws at 3825 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 206.45 (1999)).
330. FLA. STAT. § 337.27(2) (1999) has been eliminated; Ch. 99-385, § 64, 1999 Fla.
Laws 3820, 3826-27 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 215.615 (1999)).
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agreement without litigating, 331 however, the condemnee will no
332 longer be
able to recover prejudgment interest on attorneys' fees and costs.
Boulis v. Florida Department of Transportation.333 At trial, the
condemnee succeeded in winning a verdict that valued the land substantially
higher than the Department of Transportation had claimed.334 As costs, the
condemnee was awarded expert witness fees, but the trial court denied his
claim for prejudgment interest on that amount.335 The Fifth District Court of
Appeal affirmed but the decision was reversed by a unanimous Supreme
Court of Florida.136
The holding was narrow. 33 7 "[P]rejudgment interest is to be awarded on
reasonable costs in eminent domain proceedings, but only from the date
those costs were actually paid and only after the trial court makes a
determination of entitlement to the costs."' 33 8 The decision was based upon
the mandate of the Florida Constitution that the state pay "full
compensation" for property taken, 339 and the statute that provides for "all
reasonable costs incurred. ' 34 The court clarified that, "Boulis should be
awarded prejudgment interest from the date of payment once the trial court
determines reasonable entitlement. ' 341 This is consistent with the supreme
court's earlier determination that prejudgment interest could be awarded on
attorneys' fees in appropriate cases. 4 2 However, the legislature reacted
quickly and tried to overrule Boulis:343 It will be interesting to see if that
will be successful. 3 4

331. Ch. 99-385, § 57(4), 1999 Fla. Laws 3820, 3825 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 73.091
(1999)).
332. Id. § 60, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3880 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1999)).
333. 733 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1999).
334. Id. at 960-61.
335. Id. at 961.
336. Id. at 961, 963.
337. Boulis, 733 So. 2d at 963.
338. Id.
339. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
340. FLA. STAT. § 73.091(1) (1999).
341. Boulis, 733 So. 2d at 962 (emphasis added).
342. Quality Eng'd Installation, Inc. v. -igley, Inc., 670 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1996). In
contrast, the supreme court held, in Lee v. Wells FargoArmored Services, 707 So. 2d 700, 702
(Fla. 1998), that prejudgment interest on attorneys' fees was not available in workers
compensation cases due to the language of Section 440.34(1) of the Florida Statutes. Lee, 707
So. 2d at 702.
343. Ch. 99-385, § 60, 1999 Fla. Laws 3820, 3880 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 73.091
(1999)).
344. See the statutory changes discussed supra at notes 3-7.
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3 45
Blockbuster Video, Inc. v. Florida Dpartment of Transportation.
The tenant operated a store in a strip mall.
When the landlord decided to
sell the mall, it kept an outparcel and agreed to relocate the tenant to a new
building there.347 When the new building was ready, the tenant's inventory
was shifted to it, about fifty feet away.
The business was shut down for
only a few hours during the move.
The business reopened with the same
address, the same telephone number and the same customers.350
Later, the DOT took a section of the store and parking lot in a road
widening project.
The tenant claimed statutory business damages.3 52 The
trial court granted the DOT's motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that the store had not operated in that location for five years, as required by
the statute. 53 The tenant appealed on the grounds that it met the statutory
five-year period, when including its period of occupying the original store in
the calculation. 54
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding the summary
5 5 It acknowledged
judgment as inappropriate.Y
that recovery of business
damages was a matter of "legislative largess," and therefore, should be
strictly construed.35 6 However, it considered the legislative purpose behind
the statute and the plain meaning of "location" more convincing. 357 "Any
reasonable definition of 'location' creates only one location for [the tenant]
under the facts in this case. 358 Moreover, it rejected application of the
"parent tract" as the applicable test, holding that it is a doctrine used in
determining whether severance damages could be recovered, and having no
application to a business damages determination. 3 9
2
Grandpa's Park, Inc. v. Florida Department of Transportation.
When the DOT took 0.665 acres from Grandpa's Park, it claimed damages
for the diminution in value of its remaining 107 acres due to downzoning

714 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 1223.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Blockbuster, 714 So. 2d at 1223.
Id.
352. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)0b) (1995).
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

353. Blockbuster,714 So. 2d at 1223.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1225.

356. d at 1223-24.
357. Id. at 1224.
358. Blockbuster,714 So. 2d at 1224.

359. Id.
360. 726 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1st Dist.Ct. App. 1998).
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and impairment of access resulting from the elimination of its two access
routes. 36 The trial court denied recovery, and the district court affirmed.36 2
Regarding the downzone claim, the court noted that the general rule is
that the value of the condemned property is based on the facts existing at the
time of the taking, but there is an exception when the property value at that
time is depressed by the market's anticipation of that taking. 36 3 However,
Grandpa's Park did not fit into that exception because, at the trial court level,
the DOT had not influenced the city to downzone the land, 364
nor had the city
downzoned it in anticipation of the taking of the 0.665 acres.
The claim for diminution in value of the land retained was also
rejected. 365 The rule is that a partial taking does not entitle a person to
compensation for a decrease in the value of land retained. 66 The exception
to this rule is where the land taken "'constitutes an integral and inseparable
part of a single use to which the land taken and other adjoining land is
put.'',367 The court found this exception inapplicable because the loss of
access was not caused by diminishing access from an abutting road.368 The
court concluded Grandpa's "theory that, in effect, it has been deprived of all
reasonable use of the properl,
is more appropriate in the context of an
'3
inverse condemnation claim.
Judge Booth dissented. 370 He noted that the effect of the downzoning
and condemnation was to leave Grandpa's with a 107-acre tract of land on
which he is able to construct two residences, with no permitable access.3 7'
Moreover, Judge Booth argued that the majority had misread the law on
decreasing land value, due to the threat of condemnation, by focusing on the
actual filing of the condemnation rather than the announcement of intent to
condemn.
Thus, "[flactual issues existing as to these matters were
improperly removed from the jury's consideration."373

361. Id. at 790.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.

365. Grandpa'sPark,726 So. 2d at 791.
366. Id.
367. Id. (quoting Lee County v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 417 So. 2d 268, 269 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1982)).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Grandpa'sPark,726 So. 2d at 791. (Booth, J., dissenting).
371. Id.
372. Id. at 793.
373. Id. at 791.
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Seminole County v. Sanford Court Investors, Ltd.374 The County
engaged in a road widening project that required taking part of the parking
lot owned by Cumberland Farms.37 5 At that time, Cumberland had two
tenants, Deis and Hancock. 3 76 Deis' original written lease had expired and
he was then under a month to month lease. 377 Hancock was under an
extension of its original lease. 378 More than two years after the filing of the
condemnation action, Cumberland Farms notified these tenants that their
leases were being terminated so it could build itself a new larger store.3 79 In
a letter to Deis, Cumberland Farms stated, but for the condemnation, Deis
would have continued to be its "tenant for the indefinite future. 380
In the condemnation proceeding, Deis and Hancock sought business
damages. 381 Their expert witness was allowed to testify about their business
damages, calculated on the theory that their leases would be continually
renewed for the indefinite future. 38 He based this on the past history of
renewals by Cumberland Farms. 83 The district court found that the
admission of this testimony amounted to error.384
Business damages are provided by statute, not by constitutional
mandate.385 A statute providing such legislative largess is to be narrowly
construed. Consequently, a tenant is entitled to recover business damages
based only upon its leasehold interest at the time of the taking.386 Thus, Deis
was entitled to business damages suffered over a one month period, and
Hancock was entitled to business damages until the lease was properly
terminated by the landlord, prior to the end of its current term.38
The district court also found the trial court had erred in allowing, as
business damages, the losses suffered when the tenants auctioned off their
inventory and other personal property in order to vacate the premises.38 8 The
tenants never presented "any evidence [showing that] they were required to
374. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1056 (5th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1999) (the opinion cited was
later withdrawn andsupercededon clarificationby Seminole County v. Sanford Court Investors,

743 So. 2d
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

1165 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
Id. at D1056.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sanford,24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1056.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sanford,24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1056.
Id.; See FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1995).
386. Sanford,24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1056.

387. Id. at D1057.
388. Id.
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389Th

move their business property as a result of the County's taking.
They
were vacating because the landlord had terminated their leases, and
apparently, the district court did not consider the "but for" letter sufficient to
establish the causal 39connection between the taking and the landlord's
decision to terminate. 0
FloridaDepartment of Transportationv. Powell.39 1 The DOT brought
this condemnation action as part of a project funded by the Federal Highway
Administration. 392 Naegele owned a billboard and leased space for it on the
land that was being taken. 393 This qualified as a nonconforming use because
a new ordinance prohibiting off site signs was enacted. 3 4 Thus, he could not
move his sign to another location.395 Since federal funds were involved, the
Federal Uniform Relocation Act396 applied, and Naegele was entitled to
compensation under it.397 The trial court ruled that the federal statute
required separate trials, one for the billboard taking and the other for the
taking of the freehold.398 The district court disagreed, but refused to
reverse. 399 The Federal Uniform Relocation Act did abrogate the unity rule
under which the value of the property taken must be calculated and then
apportioned between the owners of the various interests. 4 However, it only
required that the jury consider the value of the leasehold separately, and that
could be accomplished without separate trials. 40 1 In this record, the trial
court, in an exercise of its discretion, could have severed the billboard
taking, thus holding separate trials did not amount to reversible error.402
On appeal, the DOT challenged the admission of expert valuation
testimony that utilized the gross rent multiplier approach. 40 3 The DOT
claimed that the method allowed, in effect, the recovery of business damages
that were not provided for by the statute, which only allowed recovery of
"just compensation." 4°4 The district court rejected this argnment. 4 5 When a
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

Id.
Id. For the same reason, the tenants' claim for moving expenses was rejected. Id
721 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 796.
Id.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 4652 (1994).
Powell, 721 So. 2d at 796-97.
Id. at 797.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Powell, 721 So. 2d at 797-98.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id.
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structure has been taken, the statute allows the owner to recover the greater
of the fair market value of the structure or the amount the structure
contributes to the value of the land.4 0 6 The statute did not provide the
method by which these values were to be calculated. Naegele's expert used
both an income approach and a market approach, based on the gross rent
multiplier, to calculate the fair market value of the structure. 4w The two
methods produced approximately the same result.40 8 Therefore, it was not
error to allow the gross rent multiplier testimony into evidence. 4w
2. Quick Taking
Florida Department of Transportation v. Barbara's Creative
Jewelry.4 10 The DOT began a road widening project. 411 It decided to take
appellee's entire parcel, because a study that the DOT performed indicated
that it would ultimately cost less than apartial taking, which would include
By statute, the legislature has
the payment of severance damages.4 1
recognized that reducing the costs of a property acquisition is a public
413
However, the owner
purpose that justified taking the additional land.
be more expensive. 414
not
would
objected, and argued that a partial taking
Logically, determining which would be more expensive involved calculating
out what the condemnation award would be for both a partial taking and a
The trial judge reasoned that valuation of the property in
full taking.
eminent domain was a jury question, thus determining which was more
416
denied the
Therefore, the judge
expensive was also a jury17 question.
18
District reversed.
Fourth
The
petition for a quick taking.
The condemning authority has the burden of showing that there was a
reasonable necessity for condemnation.4 19 Whether or not the authority has
406. Id.
407. Powell, 721 So. 2d at 798.

408. Id.
409. Id.
410. 728 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review granted, Murphy v. Florida
Dept. of Trans., 744 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1999).
411. Id. at241.
412. Id.
413. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 337.27(2) (1995).
414. Barbara'sCreativeJewelry, 728 So. 2d at 241.

415.
416.
417.
418.

Id. at 242.
Id.
Id.
Id. at243.

419. Barbara'sCreative Jewelry, 728 So. 2d at 242 (citing Lakeland v. Bunch, 293 So.
2d 66, 69 (Fla. 1974)).
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met that burden is a question for the court. 420 Here, the DOT presented the
testimony of the engineers on the road project, who professed the need for
some of the land. 42' The DOT then presented the testimony of appraisers and
accountants. 422 They testified that taking only the land needed for the road
widening project would result in a greater expense to the state than would
taking the entire parcel. 42 Consequently, the DOT had met its burden. 424
The burden then shifted to the objecting landowner to show bad faith or
an abuse of discretion by the condemning authority.42 5 These were also
questions for the court. 42 They did not involve final determinations of what
compensation would be paid to the condemnee.427 Here, the landowner
presented a "viable position" 428 that the partial taking would be cheaper, but
that did not satisfy their burden which required a showing that the DOT acted
in bad faith or abused its discretion. 429 Consequently, the trial judge should
not have denied the quick taking.430
Judge Polen wrote the dissenting opinion.4 3' He observed that the
majority opinion was at odds with the plain language of the statute.432
Furthermore, he was concerned that a due process violation would result if the
court allowed the taking, and a jury subsequently determined that a partial
taking would have been cheaper. 3 Thus, there would be no publicgUrpose to
justify taking more than the condemning authority was going to use. Inlight
of these thoughtful arguments, it is hoped that the supreme court will answer
the certified question:
WHERE CONDEMNATION UNDER SECTION 337.27(2),
FLORIDA STATUTES, IS REQUESTED, AND THE
PROPERTY OWNER DISPUTES THE RELATIVE VALUES OF
A WHOLE TAKE OVER A PARTIAL TAKE, MAY A TRIAL
COURT DENY A QUICK TAKING UNDER SECTION 74.031,
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Barbara'sCreativeJewelry, 728 So. 2d at 242.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Barbara'sCreative Jewelry, 728 So. 2d at 242.
Id. at 243.
dissenting).
Id. (Polen, J.,
Id. at 244; see FLA. STAT. § 337.27(2) (1995).
Powell, 728 So. 2d at 244.
Id.

Brown/Grohman

1999]

FLORIDA STATUTES, AND DEFER THE QUESTION OF THE
EXTENT OF THE TAKE UNTIL A JURY DETERMINES THE
VALUE OF BOTH A WHOLE TAKE AND A PARTIAL TAKE
OF THE PROPERTY?435
B.

Inverse Condemnation

Hernando County v. Anderson.436 Billboards were located on land that
the county acquired. 437 The county destroyed them without giving their
owners any notice or opportunity to remove them.438 The owners brought
this suit against the county for compensation. 439 "In Florida, billboards are
considered personal property rather than realty."" 0 Consequently, acquisition of the land did not include title to the
441 billboards, and the county was
held liable for taking this private property.
Palm Beach County v. Cove Club Investors.44 - The county condemned
a lot in a residential mobile home community and paid compensation to the
44 4
lot owner.443 The plaintiff in this case runs the community's country club.
Under the recorded Declaration of Conditions, Covenants, Restrictions and
Reservations, each purchaser of a lot in the mobile home community was
required to pay a monthly recreational fee to the country club, in exchange
for the right to use the club's recreational facilities. 445 The effect of the
condemnation was to give the county title to that lot, free of the burden of
paying that monthly fee.446 The plaintiff characterized this as a taking of its
private property for public use, and therefore, demanded compensation in
this inverse condemnation action. 447 The circuit court, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, 448 and the Supreme Court of Florida all agreed. 449

435. Id. at 243.
436. 737 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (July 21, 1999).
437. Id. at 569.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Anderson, 737 So. 2d at 569.
442. 734 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1999).
443. Id. at 380.
444. Id.
445. Id. at380-81.
446. Id.
447. Cove Club Investors, 734 So. 2d at 380.
448. Palm Beach County v. Cove Club Investoirs, Ltd., 692 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
449. Cove Club Investors, 734 So. 2d at 381.
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The court noted that the loss of the benefit of every covenant will not
result in a compensable taking.45° Thus, if the lot was taken in a
development that was the subject of mutual restrictive covenants, the owners
of the other lots would not have a claim for compensation
due solely to the
• . 451
loss of that one lot from the scheme of restrictions.
Nor would the owner
of a franchise, such as the right to supply gas to the homes in the
development, have a valid claim for compensation when one of the home
lots was taken in an eminent domain action. 452 The court went to great
lengths to point out that this case was different.453 Here, each lot owner had
a right of access to the club's property, and the club was still required to
provide those facilities to the remaining lot owners, in reliance on its income
from those fees.454 Moreover, the club had a corresponding right to a lien on
any lot whose owner failed to pay the fees.455 Consequently, the club had
more than mere contract rights.
The club had lost property and
compensation must be paid for it.
Senior Justice Overton found this
distinction unconvincing.4 57 To him, this was just one more provider of
services who had lost a customer, and not a situation requiring the payment
458
of compensation. 4
5
City of Miami v. Keshbro, Inc.4 9 The Nuisance Abatement Board was
faced with the difficult problem of abating prostitution and drug use at a
motel. 460 A series of limited solutions, including partial closures, failed to
cure the problem, so the Board issued a six month closure order that was
enforced by an injunction issued by the circuit court. 461 The motel's owner
sought compensation, alleging that it had been deprived of all economic use
of its property for the six month period. 462 "We are faced with a deceptively
simple-appearing question: whether the owners are required to be
compensated by the City for a valid exercise of the City's power to abate
nuisances because that exercise deprived the owners, at least temporarily, of

450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
1999).
460.
461.
462.

Id. at 383.
Id.
See id.
Justice Anstead wrote the majority opinion. Id.
Cove Club Investors, 734 So. 2d at 381.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 390 (Overton, J., dissenting).
Id.
717 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review granted, 729 So. 2d 392 (Fla.
Id. at 602.
Id.
Id. at 603.
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all economic use of their property." 463 The court concluded that Lucas
provided the controlling law, but still found that compensation was not
required.4 54 "[T]he record reflects that the motel was, in reality, not a motel,
but rather a brothel and drug house which the owners, for whatever reason,
failed to stop operating on their property."46 - These were public nuisances
that were not protected by the common law. 46 The owner had no riht to
continue them and their continuation could be prohibited by the city. W No
compensation would be required if shutting down the motel was the only
468
In fact, these activities had become
method to stop these uses.
"inextricably intertwined with the motel."469
470
The
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District.
1
landowner wanted to develop a portion of his property.4 To do so, he
needed a permit to dredge 3.4 acres of wetlands, along with a wetland
resource management permit.47 2 The Water Management District indicated
it would issue the permits if he would deed part of his land to the district,
and also replace culverts over four miles away as offsite mitigation. 473 He
refused to perform the offsite mitigation, so the district denied his permit
As a result, Koontz filed this suit claiming inverse
application.
condemnation. 474
The Water Management District raised the defense of ripeness. 475 It
claimed that he could have, and should have, attempted to make additional
filings, offering different concessions, until an agreement could be reached
476
found this argument
court
The477trial
his permits.
obtain
he couldbut
so
....
simply,
Quite
court reversed.
the district
convincing,
[t]here is no requirement that an owner turned down in his effort to
develop his property must continue to submit offers until the
463. Id.
464. Keshbro, 717 So. 2d at 604 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505

U.S. 1003 (1992)).
465. Id.

466. Id. at 605.
467. See id.

468. Id. at 604-05.
469. Keshbro, 717 So. 2d at 602.
470. 720 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 729 So. 2d 394 (Fla.
1999).
471. Id. at 561.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474.
475.
476.
477.

Id.
Koontz, 720 So. 2d at 561.
Id. at 562.
Id.
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governing body finally approves one before he can go to court. If
the governing body finally turns down an application and the owner
does not desire to make any further concessions in order to
possibly obtain an approval, the issue is ripe.478
In a footnote, the court distinguished this case from Williamson Co.
Regional Planning v. Hamilton Bank,479 where the landowner could have
480
applied for a variance but had not done so.
South Florida Water Management Distric. v. Basore of Florida,Inc.
Basore was growing lettuce on its farm when a big storm hit.482 It claimed
that its lettuce crop was damaged by flooding, resulting from the high water
levels in the District's canals thwarting its efforts to pump water off its
fields. 8 3 The Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected its claim that a taking
had occurred. 48
The court recognized that a governmental taking of
personal property would require compensation, but concluded that these
damaged crops were part of the realty. 485 At best, the flooding might have
amounted to a temporary taking of the land, but that argument had never
been raised by Basore. 48 6 Consequently, there was no basis for relief under
the taking clause. 48 7 Basore would have to base any claim for relief on a tort
theory, e.g., declaring that the district had been neligent in not reducing the
water levels enough in the canal before the storm.
Town of Jupiterv. Alexander.48 9 The claimant contracted to buy vacant
land in June, 1988. 490 The land consisted of a parcel on the shore and an
island about 500 yards from the mainland. 491 Due to problems with the
zoning of the island, she was not able to finalize her plan to build on the
mainland and the island until late 1991.492 She sued for a temporary taking
478. Id.
479. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
480. Koontz, 720 So. 2d at 562 n.2 (citing Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v.
Hanilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 187-88 (1985)).
481. 723 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 740 So. 2d 527 (Fla.
1999).
482. Id. at 288.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 289.
486. Basore, 723 So. 2d at 288.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 290.
489. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2139 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 729 So. 2d 389
(Fla. 1999).
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. at D2140.
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of her land during that period. 493 The district court concluded that she had
not been deprived of all use of her land when considering it as one parcel,
and that was appropriate, even though they were not physically contiguous,
because: 1) they were to be put to one integrated use; 2) one owner owned
both parcels, i.e., there was unity of ownership; and 3) they were to be
treated by their owner as one integrated tract. 494 In fact, the highest and best
use of the island could only be achieved if the island was developed jointly
with the mainland tract.495 The owner was not prevented from using the
mainland tract while the approvals were obtained for the island portion,
. 496
therefore, so there was no taking.
This seems oddly like a Catch-22,
because it would have been unreasonable for the owner to proceed with her
plans on the mainland without knowing if she would ever get the island
portion approved. 497 She could have found herself stuck with structures
intended for supporting island use, which may have 49
never
occurred, and this
8
would have put her plans for the entire tract on hold.
XI. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
4 99
The City of Jacksonville v. American Environmental Services, Inc.
The court addressed the lower court judge's declaratory statement
concerning the applicability and validity of the local certificate of need
("CON") application ordinances. 500 This court affirmed the lower court's
decision and held American Environmental Services could
not be compelled
50 1
to procure a local CON from the City of Jacksonville.
Jacksonville's CON ordinances, as applied to American Environmental
Services proposed hazardous waste transfer station, conflicted with chapter
403 of the Florida Statutes.502 The Jacksonville ordinance requires a
violation of local need, and ordains a condition
requiring that the waste only
50 3
be of the type produced in Duval County.
In comparison, chapter 403 of the Florida Statutes documents a
statewide need for hazardous waste facilities, and ponders regional facilities

493. Id.
494. Alexander, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2140-41.
495. Id. at D2141.

496. Id.
497. See id.
498. See id.
499. 699 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997), review denied, 717 So. 2d 529 (Fla.
1998).
500. Id. at 256.
501. Id
502. Id.; See FLA. STAT. § 403.7225(8) (1995).
503. AmericanEnvtL Servs., Inc., 699 So. 2d at 256.
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for the transfer, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste.5 4 The City of
Jacksonville can not prevent the facility by determining lack of local need,
even though statutes refer to local assessments of hazardous waste
management. 0 5 Local assessments have the puo
ose of collecting
5
information for an evaluation of need within the state.
Local governments cannot enact an ordinance relating to the subject of
hazardous waste regulation more stringent than section 403. 507 Pursuant to
chapter 403, local governments can control the zoning of such hazardous
waste, and ordain requisite conditions to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of citizens. 508 However, it may not implement a further obligation to
satisfy a test for local need .5
Secret Oaks Owner's Ass'n v. Department of Environmental
Protection.51°
The final order of the Department of Environmental
Protection ("DEP") denied the association the right to request a permit to
build a dock on sovereign land.511 This court concluded that the association
had a "sufficient title interest" in the uplands for the purpose of obtaining
authorization to build a dock, and thus, the final order was reversed.5 12
This is the third appeal involving the two parties in dispute here, the
association and the Parlatos. 1 3 This brief pertains solely to the last
appeal.514 The association, through Environmental Services, Inc., filed an
application with the DEP for the pernits needed to build the dock.515 This
was the issue of the prior appeal. 16 The application solicited a dredge fill
permit and authorization from the state, as owner of the submerged lands, to
assemble such dock.5 17 Almost a year later, the DEP denied the application
and stated that the holder of an easement does not have sufficient title

504. Id. at 256; see FLA. STAT. § 403.7225(7), (8) (1995); FLA. STAT. § 403.723 (1995).
505. American Envtl. Servs., Inc., 699 So. 2d at 256.
506. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 403.7225 (1995).
507. American Envtl. Servs., Inc., 699 So. 2d at 256; see FLA. STAT. § 403.7225(10)
(1995).
508. American EnvtI. Servs., Inc., 699 So. 2d at 257; see Escambia County v.Trans.
Pac., 584 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1991).
509. American Envtl. Servs., Inc., 699 So. 2d at 257.
510. 704 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review dismissed, 719 So. 2d 288
(Fla. 1998).
511. Id. at 703.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. See id.
515. Secret Oaks Owner'sAss'n, 704 So. 2d at 704.
516. Id.
517. Id.
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interest to make an application for activities pertaining to submerged
lands. 1 8
In return, Secret Oaks requested a formal hearing.
The hearing
officer determined that there were no material issues of fact, and thus,
ordered the case back to the agency for an informal hearing. 5 The director
at the informal hearing stated the issue as whether the association, as the
holder of an easement, is among the class of persons permitted to file a
request to perform activities on state-owned sovereign submerged lands. 21
The director issued a lengthy order regarding such issue.5
The DEP framed the issue as follows:
[W]hether the Association, as the holder of recorded contractual
rights to construct, maintain and use all docks on lot 10, and,
concomitantly, to limit the rights of any owner or lessee of lot 10,
is precluded from applying for a permit to construct a dock because
the rule requirement of "sufficient title interest in uplands for the
intended purpose" means the appellant must have a possessory
interest in the upland property.5 z
In this case, the Owners' Agreement and the recorded easement on lot
ten provided that lot owners in the Secret Oaks Subdivision were granted
pedestrian access to the St. John's River and to any dock that is situated or
may later be situated thereon. 524 5The Association was obligated to improve,
repair, or maintain the easement. 25
The DEP relies on the definition of "title interest" as set forth in
Black's Law Dictionary: Title is defined as, "the means whereby the owner
of lands has the just possession of his property. The union of all the
elements which constitute ownership. Full independent and fee ownership[;]
The right to or ownership in land ...,,526 Just because title can be the
means to receive right of possession, that does not dictate that all possessory
interests are title interests.527 This case clearly shows that the association
has recorded contractual rights in lot ten adequate to grant the right to

518. Id.
519. Id. at 705.
520. Secret Oaks Owner's Ass'n, 704 So. 2d at 705.

521. Id
522. Id.
523. Id at 706.

524.
525.
526.
527.

I
Secret Oaks Owner'sAss'n,704 So. 2d at 706.
Id. at 707; see BLACK's LAW DIcIONARY 1485 (6th ed. 1990).
Secret Oaks Owner'sAss'n, 704 So. 2d at 707.
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construct the dock. 528 If the language "sufficient title interest in the uplands"
meant only "right of possession," the Agency would have specified.
In addition, the DEP offers no reason why a possessory interest is the
only possible "title interest," or why "possessory" interests would be the
minimum "sufficient title interest" for dockbuilding permit application.530
This court viewed the Agency's interpretation as illogical and
unreasonable. 531 To interpret "title interest" as meaning "right of
possession" creates irrational distinctions.5 32
XII. HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS

Section 617.303 of the Florida Statutes has a new subsection (8).
This subsection provides that "[a]ll association funds held by a developer
shall be maintained separately in the association's name." 534 There shall be
535
no commingling of reserve and operating funds prior to turnover.
However, the association may jointly invest reserve funds, even though the
invested funds must be accounted for separately.536
Section 617.307 of the Florida Statutes has a new subsection (3).

This subsection is designed to provide for the transition of a homeowners'
association control in a community. 538 Under this subsection, such shall
occur when the members are entitled to elect at least a majority of the board
of directors of the homeowners' association. 539 The developer shall, at its
expense, have no more than ninety days to deliver the prescribed documents
to the board. 54°
Section 617.0375 of Florida Statutes was enacted to create a list 5of
41
prohibitive clauses to be found in homeowners' association documents.
Subsection (1) and its sub parts prohibit provisions to the effect that the
developer has the unilateral ability, and right, to make changes in the
homeowners' association documents, after the transition of the association's
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Secret Oaks Owner'sAss'n, 704 So. 2d at 707.
FLA. STAT. § 617.303(8) (1999).
Id. § 617.303(8)(a).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 617.307(3).
FLA. STAT. § 617.307(3) (1999).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 617.3075(1).
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control in a community to the non-developer members. s42 Also, the
association is restricted from filing a lawsuit against the developer, and the
developer is entitled to cast votes in an amount that exceeds one vote per
residential lot, after the transition to the association 5 43
Subparagraph (2) declares the prohibited position, stated above,
unenforceable as a matter of public policy, where those clauses
544 were created
on or after the effective date of that section, October 1, 1998.
XII. INSURANCE

Fassiv. American Fire & Casualty Co.545 The appellate court affirmed
final judgment denying Fassi's claim for fire damages. 46 Fassi's home was
destroyed by fire and he filed a claim for damages under their homeowners'
policy. 547 American Fire and Casualty ("American") was suspicious as to
the cause of the fire, and wanted Fassi to submit to examination under oath
and provide a sworn claim of loss. 548 The examination was never conducted
since Fassi failed to contact the attorneys involved. 549 In addition, Fassi still
failed to respond after American followed up with a letter.
The law firm
scheduled the examination on behalf of American. 551 In return, Fassi refused
to submit to the sworn examination because of the threat of criminal
proceedings. 552
A claimant cannot recover fire losses under an insurance policy and
refuse to comply with policy requirements to submit to sworn examination
because
criminal charges related to the cause of fire may be pending against
553
him.
The examination was again rescheduled, and once again, Fassi failed to
appear or respond.554 Three months later, Fassi wished to have the

542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.

Id.
FLA. STAT. § 617.3075(1) (1999).
Id. § 617.3075(2).
700 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 52.
ikId.
I
Fassi,700 So. 2d at 52.
Id.
Id.
I
Id.
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late. 555
examination conducted but American responded that it was too
556
policy.
the
on
Summary judgment was granted after Fassi filed suit
This court agreed with American's contentions.557 Fassi was given one
last chance to explain the refusal to cooperate, and failure to respond would
lead to denial of the claim.55 Since Fassi did not explain, no further notice
was required on American's behalf 5 59 The final letter to Fassi was only an
opportunity to explain, not a chance to participate.
The court concluded
561
that five opportunities to participate were enough.
XIV. LANDLORD AND TENANT
ARC Foods, Inc. v. MGI Properties.562 The commercial lease provided
that: "[d]uring the lease term and any options; the landlord agrees not to rent
to any other tenant that sells take-out or delivery pizza. 56 The landlord
rented the neighboring space to an Italian restaurant, so the tenant declared
5 64
the lease had been breached, moved out, and refused to pay any more rent.
The landlord brought this action for damages. 565 The affidavit of the owner
of the neighboring restaurant acknowledged that the store did sell take-out
pizza, but claimed that its take-out pizza sales amounted to less than one half
of one percent of the business of any of its restaurants. 566 Based on that
for the landlord. 67 The
affidavit, the trial court granted summary judgment
568
decision.
court's
trial
the
reversed
district court
The district court first addressed the summary judgment issue and held
that summary judgment should only be granted when there are no genuine
issues of material fact. 569 The lease with the neighboring restaurant did,
however, technically violate the terms of this lease. 57° The landlord's claim
that the violation was minimal, and had little effect on the tenant, created an
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.

Fassi,700 So. 2d at 53.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Fassi,700 So. 2d at 53.
Id.
724 So. 2d 663 (Fla.2d Dist. CL App. 1999).
Id. at 664.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ARC Foods,724 So. 2d at 664.
Id. at 665.
FLA.R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
ARC Foods, 724 So. 2d at 664.
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57 1
issue of fact that could be resolved only by a judge weighing the evidence.

Thus, summary judgment was inappropriate.
Furthermore, the claim that
the tenant had waived its rights under this clause by failing to object earlier,
or to the presence of other competing restaurantss 3also raised issues of fact
that could not be resolved by summary judgment.5
The court also declared that the trial court had erred in its calculation of
damages. 574 The landlord found another tenant for the vacated space, and
the court awarded the landlord the real estate broker's commission.57 5
However, the new tenant's lease was at a higher rent, and for a period
longer, than was left on the defendant's lease. 576-The defendant could not be
held liable for a commission that was calculated at the higher rent and longer
term. 577 The defendant was liable only for paying the commission involved
in finding its replacement, i.e., a commission
based on the remaining term
578
and at the rent provided for in the lease.
DHSH Corp. v. Affordable Enterprises Exchange.579 When this
commercial lease was negotiated, the tenant wanted an option to renew for
another seven-year term because of the substantial capital investment
involved in setting up an automobile paint and body shop.80 The landlord,
concerned that the shop might be an eyesore, included in the lease a clause
requiring the outside to be cleaned twice daily and cars to be stored inside at
night.58 ' 58It
2 also contained a renewal option which was the source of the
problem.
The lease granted the tenant a five-year option to renew, but it went on
to provide that, "[1]andlord-at [l]andlord's sole option to renew-shall
notify [t]enant if they desire to honor the option ....5" Who had the right
to exercise, or not exercise, the renewal option? The successor landlord,
interpreting the lease as giving that right to the landlord, decided it did not
want to renew the lease, and sent the tenant a notice that the lease would not

571. Id.
572. Id.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.
578.
579.
580.

Id.
Id. at 664-65.
ARC Foods, 724 So. 2d at 664.
Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 665.
Id.
734 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
Id. at 568.

581. Id.
582. Id.
583. Id.
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be renewed.
Wanting to renew the lease, the tenant brought this action for
declaratory judgment.'
The trial court concluded that the renewal option contained an
irreconcilable conflict.586 The landlord and tenant could not both have a
renewal option. Attempting to reconcile all the terms, the landlord asserted
that the intent was to give the landlord the right to offer the tenant the
renewal option if it wanted to, but that would have rendered the option
illusory.
The court solved the problem by invoking the "principles of
contract construction," under which an ambiguous term must be interpreted
against the one who drafted it.588 In this case, the term was drafted by the
landlord's real estate broker, so the term was interpreted in favor of the
tenant. 589 The term was drafted by the agent of the prior landlord, not the
successor landlord involved in this 59litigation, but it did not change the
application of the rule or the outcome. 0
Foster v. Matthews.5 91 The lease included two paragraphs relating to
the landlord's liability if the tenant suffered injury. 59 The first portion of
the lease provided that the landlord would not be liable for damage or injury
caused by water. 93 The second portion provided that the tenant placed its
personal property on the premises, at its own risk. 94 Water leaked into the
leased premises, causing one of the co-tenants to slip and fall, and she sued
the landlord for negligence.' 9' Relying on the terms in the lease, the trial
596
judge granted summary judgment for the landlord.
The Third District
5 97
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision.
Exculpatory clauses are not favored in the law to absolve the landlord
from liability due to its negligence. 98 The clause must be clear enough to
release a party from liability for negligence. 5 99 The terms in this lease did
not provide such a clear statement of intent, so the court should not have
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.

DHSH, 734 So. 2d at 568.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 569.
DHSH, 734 So. 2d at 568.
Id. at 568-69.
714 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 1216.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Foster, 714 So. 2d at 1216.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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granted summary judgment.6
However, Judge Cope, in a brief
concurrence, observed that in a prior case, a lease similar to this had been
read to reveal a clear intent to absolve the landlord of liability for its own
negligence when exculpatory clauses
6 1 similar to these were read in
conjunction with an indemnity clause. 0
Greco v. Corn.6°2 Here, the parties had entered into a four-year
commercial lease that included a purchase option.0 3 However, a dispute
quickly arose as to whether the purchase price included rent credit.0 4 The
landlords notified the tenants that they would not accept any rent payments
until the option issue was resolved.60- When an agreement could not be
reached, the landlords brought an unsuccessful action for declaratory
judgment to determine whether there had been a "meeting of the minds" to
create a binding contract. 606 Following the conclusion of that action, the
landlords sent the tenants letters demanding the unpaid rent.6w When the
tenants failed to make payment, the landlords sought 6 and obtained an
eviction judgment removing the tenants from the property. 08
This case began when the tenants brought an action for specific
performance of the option. 60 The landlords then counterclaimed for the
unpaid rent and the unpaid option fee. 6 10 The tenants' defense was that the
landlords waived their claims by refusing to accept the payments. 6 1 The
trial court denied relief to both. 61 The Second District Court of Appeal held
that the landlords had not waived their claims. 613 Unfortuiately, the court
does not explain why this was not a waiver. The landlords' refusal to accept
"rent payments until a determination was made regarding the option to
purchase clause .... ,,614

600. Id.
601. Foster,714 So. 2d at 1217 (citing Meyer v. Carribbean Interiors, Inc., 435 So. 2d
936 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1983)).
602. 724 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1998), review denied, 735 So. 2d 1284 (Fla.
1999).
603. Id. at 613.
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Id.
607. Greco, 724 So. 2d at 613.

608.
609.
610.
611.

Id.
Id. at 612.
Id.
at 613.
Id.

612. Greco, 724 So. 2d at 613.
613. Id.
614. Id.
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615

LaFountainv. Estate of Kelly.
This commercial lease had a renewal
option that provided "[i]n the event Lessee exercises its option to renew, the
lease payment for the renewal period will be negotiated between the
parties." 16 The tenant gave notice of her intent to exercise the option, but
617
the parties could not agree on the amount of the rent payments.
Subsequently, the tenant died and her estate brought this suit against the
landlord for wrongful breach of the renewal option and tortious breach of
contract. 618 The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and the
district court affirmed.6 19
Here, the parties could not agree to the rent and the option did not
provide a rent amount or a method to calculate a rent amount.620 Once the
parties had failed to reach an agreement, the court had no method for
calculating what the rent should have been.g2 l The court could not provide a
term that the parties622failed to agree on, there had been no meeting of the
minds on that point.
Therefore, the renewal option was too vague to be
enforced. 62 3 The district court avoided language in an earlier case that such
options were valid by pointing out that case was an eminent domain action.
In the past, the parties had not even begun to negotiate the extension term
when the condemnation proceeding began, so it was still possible that the
extension option
might be successfully implemented but for the
624
condemnation.
Making Ends Meet, Inc. v. Cusick.625 The landlord sued for unpaid rent,
and the tenant counterclaimed for tortious interference with a business
relationship. 626 The tortious interference claim was based on the landlord's
exercise of his power under the lease to either approve, or not approve, a
proposed sale of the lease by the tenant. 6 27 The landlord's defense was that
he could not be held liable for interference with a business relationship of
which he was a party. 628 The trial and district courts disagreed with that
615. 732 So. 2d 503 (Fla.Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
616. Id. at 504.
617. Id.
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. LaFountain,732 So. 2d at 505.
621. Id.
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. Id.(citing State Rd. Dep't v. Tampa Bay Theaters, Inc., 208 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1968)).
625. 719 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 732 So. 2d 326 (Fla.
1999).
626. Id. at 926-27.
627. Id. at 927.
628. Id.
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interpretation of the law.629 Apparently, the landlord created one hurdle after
another to prevent the tenant from ever successfully assigning its
leasehold.630 The landlord had no right to play that game. His approval
power could only be exercised for a proper purpose. His wrongful conduct
under this set of circumstances cost him $250,000.63
Margolis v. Andromides.632 The tenant had a twenty-five year lease
with an option to renew for an additional twenty-five years.633 The tenant
sent two letters
•634to the landlords giving notice that he was exercising his
renewal option.
In response, the tenant received a letter from a relative of
635
In 1992, eleven years later,
the landlords, authorizing the lease extension.
but still during the original term of the lease, the tenant received a
surprise. 636 The landlords claimed that the extension option had never been
exercised and that their relative did not have the authority to authorize an
63
extension.637 The dispute went to arbitration, where it was concluded that
638
In 1997, the tenant brought this suit against
the landlords were correct.
the relative for breach of implied warranty of authority. 63 9 The circuit court
granted the landlords' motion for summary judgment based on the statute of
limitations.6 4o
Breach of implied warranty of authority is subject to a four year statute
of limitations. 64' The critical question was when the cause of action accrued
so that the time would begin to run.642 The tenant claimed it began to run at
the arbitration award, but the circuit court had disagreed, and the district
court affirmed.6 43 The opinion stated, "[a] cause of action 'accrues' when
the last element necessary to constitute the cause of action occurs." 6 " The
arbitration award was not a necessary element.645 This cause of action is
based upon misrepresentation, and the final element of misrepresentation is
629.
630.
631.
632.

Id. at 927-28.
Making Ends Meet, Inc., 719 So. 2d at 928.
Id. at 927.
732 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).

633. Id. at 508.
634. Id.
635. Id.

636. Id.
637. Margolis,732 So. 2d at 508.
638. Id. at508-09.
639. Id. at 509.

640. Id.
641. Id.
642. Margolis,732 So. 2d at 509.

643. Id.
644. Id.
645. Id.
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that harm is caused by it. 646 That happened when the landlords repudiated
their relative's authority to extend the lease. 647 This happened more than
6 Nothing had tolled
four years before the complaint in this case was filed.
649 "
barred.
was
action
the
so
statute,
the running of the
Menendez v. Palms W. Condominium Ass'n.65 The condominium
association acted as the rental manager for the unit in question. 65 1 The
tenant heard a knock at the door, opened it, and at least two people came
inside. 652 One of the individuals shot the tenant. 653 This suit charged that
the unit owners and the condominium association were liable because they
had breached their duty of care by failing to provide adequate security on the
premises, in particular, by failing to provide a peephole or door scope by
which a person inside the unit could see who was outside the front door.
Although the tenant's expert testified that this was a high crime area, the
circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants. 55
The general rule is that a landlord has no duty to protect a tenant from
criminal acts of third persons.656 In order for such a duty to arise, "the tenant
must allege and prove that the landlord had actual or constructive knowledge
of prior similar acts committed on invitees on the premises., 65 7 However,
the existence of crime in the area "was not sufficient to put the defendants
on constructive notice of a particular risk. ' 658 Moreover, there was nothing
in the record to show that the crime in the area was the type of crime that
could have been prevented by installing a peephole or door scope.659
The tenant also failed to establish that the lack of a peephole or door
scope was a defect or inherently dangerous condition.
There was no
evidence that the unit would have been made safer by the installation of such
devices. 661 In addition, even if this was a defect, it was an obvious defect,
and not a latent one. 662 Finally, neither the lease nor the Residential
646. Id.
647. Margolis, 732 So. 2d at 510.

648. Id.
649.
650.
651.
652.
653.
654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.

Id.
736 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 59.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Menendez, 736 So. 2d at 60.
Id.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id.
Menendez, 736 So. 2d at 61.
Id.
Id. at 61-62.
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Landlord and Tenant Act imposed a duty on the landlord to provide a
663
Thus, the decision of the circuit court was
peephole 66or
4 door scope.
affirmed.
665
Estate of Basile v. Famest,Inc. . Basile guaranteed a commercial lease
for a company in which he was a stockholder. 6 The guaranty was limited
to defaults during the first two years of the original lease, or the first three
years of an approved sublease.667 The tenant transferred his rights and
interests to LM, a local corporation, under a document that stated that the
landlord was not releasing the original tenant from liability under the
A default occured more than two years after the original lease was
lease.
entered, but the landlord sued on the guaranty claiming that the guarantor
was still liable.6 69 The landlord's theory was that the default had occured
during the first three years of a sublease.670 The death of the guarantor was
not an issue addressed in this decision.
The trial court concluded that the transaction with LM was a sublease,
and the landlord expressly reserved the right to hold the original tenant
liable.671 Therefore, the guaranty was still in effect at the time of the
673
672
Under the traditional
breach. 672 However, the district court disagreed.
a reversionary interest. 674
kept
tenant
the
if
test, a sublease would occur only
The tenant here made no attempt to keep any such interest, therefore the
landlord's retaining rights had no effect upon the characterization of the
transaction.6 75 Since the67guarantee was not extended by an assignment, the
guarantor was not liable. 5
Straub Capital Corp. v. Chopin.677 In November 1994, a law firm
entered into a fifty page lease that contained an integration clause, providing
that all negotiations and agreements were in the writing.678 The lease did
contain a time is of the essence clause, but did not contain an express
663. Id. at 62.

664.
665.
666.
667.
668.
669.
670.
671.
672.
673.
674.
675.
676.
677.
678.

Id.
718 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 892.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Basile, 718 So. 2d at 892.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 892.
Basile, 718 So. 2d at 893.
Id.
724 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 578.
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occupancy date. 679 The space was not ready for occupancy until April,
1995. 680 After taking possession, the firm sued for damages, alleging that68it
had been assured that the space would be ready by the first of January. 1
Based upon the evidence, the trial court rejected the fraud in the inducement
claim, but granted substantial damages for lost profits based on negligent
misrepresentation. 68263The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. 8 3
"[A]bsent some conduct resulting in personal injury or property
damage, there can be no independent tort flowing from a contractual breach
,,684
which would justify a tort claim solely for economic losses .
Fraud in the
inducement would have been an independent tort on which damages could
have been rendered, but the court rejected that claim. 685 Consequently, the
claim was essentially that the landlord had breached the lease by failing to
deliver the premises on time.686 At best, there was a contractual breach.687
Since the claim688was solely for economic loss, tort damages should not have
been awarded.
WPB, Ltd. v. Supran.689 A commercial lease provided that deposit
money would bear interest, but failed to specify a rate.69 0 The district court
concluded that the rate would be supplied by section 687.01 of the Florida
Statutes.691 That statute provided, "'[i]n all cases where interest shall accrue
without a special contract for the rate thereof, the rate shall be 12 percent per
annum, but the parties may contract for a greater or lesser rate by a contract
in writing.', 692 A special contract is a contract that would have to be express
because it could not be implied in law or in fact. 693 The lease was silent as

679. Id.
680. Id.
681. Id.
682. Straub Capital,724 So. 2d at 578-79.
683. Id. at 579.
684. Id. (citing HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239
(Fla. 1996)).
685. Id.
686. Id.
687. Straub Capital,724 So. 2d at 579.
688. Id.
689. 720 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
690. Id. at 1092.
691. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 687.01 (1989)). The current version of the statute
incorporates, by reference, the rate set according to section 55.03 of the Florida Statutes. See
FLA. STAT.

§ 55.03 (1999).

692. Supran, 720 So. 2d at 1092 (quoting FLA.
693. Id. at 1092-93.

STAT.

§ 687.01 (1989)).
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694
to the interest rate, so there
Thus,
69 was no special contract to set the rate.
5
gap.
the statute filled that

XV. LIENS
Morse Diesel International,Inc. v. 2000 Island Boulevard, Inc.696 The
appellate court reversed a peremptory writ of mandamus authorizing release
of a cash bond in favor of 2000 Island Boulevard, Inc. ("Williams Island"),
owner and developer of a 280 unit condominium project.697 The court
remanded, with directions that Williams Island redeposit disbursed proceeds
from the cash bond pending further orders.69 8

Morse Diesel sued Williams Island for money due under a construction
contract. 699 The parties entered into an agreement which gave Morse Diesel
a lien on twenty condo units to secure the claim.700 Morse agreed to release
its lien rights as to the other units. 7 1 Williams Island posted a bond on a
prorated basis as to five of the units. 702 Morse asserted additional claims
when another dispute arose between the parties. 70 3 Williams Island later
filed an emergency motion for the clerk to transfer the existing liens to its
cash bond and to reduce
7 4 Morse's amended claim of lien when the
subcontractors were paid. 0
The trial court allowed the lien transfer to a cash bond, but denied
Williams Island's request for reduction of the bond.705 Since Williams
Island failed to receive the bond reduction, it filed for a writ of mandamus
directing the clerk to disburse the cash bond as per section 713.24(4) of the
Florida Statutes.706 The lower court directed the clerk to release the cash
bond.7°
The appellate court concluded that the lower court abused its discretion
in granting the writ of mandamus where:

694.
695.
696.
697.
698.
699.
700.
701.
702.
703.

Id. at 1093.
Id.
698 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 310.
Id at313.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 311.
Morse Diesel, 698 So. 2d at 311.
Id.
Id.

704. Id
705. Id.

706. Morse Diesel, 698 So. 2dat311.
707. Id.
at 312.
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(1) the record did not disclose Williams Island's clear legal right to
the same in that a genuine dispute existed as to whether Morse
Diesel's claim of lien had expired by operation of law; (2)
Williams Island had another adequate legal remedy to procure the
release of these funds; and (3) Morse Diesel was an interested party
to the70mandamus
proceeding who had not been brought before the
8
court.

To receive a writ of mandamus, "petitioner must demonstrate a clear
legal right to the performance of a ministerial duty by the respondent and
that no other adequate remedy exists." 7 9 The court found that Williams
Island did not establish a clear legal right to a mandamus where the clerk's
answer and defenses created a genuine issue of fact about whether Morse's
claim of lien had expired and/or been satisfied.710 Williams Island did not
allege in its complaint that it had no adequate remedy at law.7 1 Just because
Williams Island was unsuccessful in getting2the bond reduced, this did not
signify that such remedies were inadequate.
The court also held that the writ should not have been entered when
Morse was an interested party, but was given no notice or opportunity to be
heard on the issues.713 In addition, it was an abuse of discretion to grant the
writ releasing the cash bond when the funds were in dispute between the
parties in another pending action.7 14 The lower court should have required
Williams Island to redeposit disbursed proceeds of the cash bond.
Robinson v. Sterling Door & Window Co. 715 The issue before the court
was whether the trial court erred when applying section 55.10(1) of the
Florida Statutes to Sterling Door's judgment lien on Robinson's real
estate.716 The trial court determined that Sterling Door had a valid lien on
Robinson's property.717 Robinson claimed the lien was defective because
Sterling's address was lacking, as required per section 55.10(1). 711 The trial
court held that the statute was satisfied since the names of the attorneys
involved were included in the judgment lien.7 19 The court noted that section
708.
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.

Id.
Iae; see Pino v. District Court of Appeal, 604 So. 2d 1232, 1233 (Fla. 1992).
Moore Diesel, 698 So. 2d at 312.
Id.
d
Ua
Id.
698 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
U at 571.
Id.
Id; see FLA. STAT. § 55.10(l) (1997).

719. Robinson, 698 So. 2d at 571.
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55.10(1) of the FloridaStatutes specifically recognizes that "'[a]judgment,
order, or decree does not become a lien on real estate unless the address of
the person who has a lien as a resultof suchjudgment.. .is contained in the
judgment.''' 20 Since courts must give effect to statutory language, the
appellee's address must be on the judgment lien.72 1 Without the address,
there was no lien on Robinson's real estate.722
Wolf v. Spariosu.723 The appellate court reversed final summary
judgment of foreclosure, which declared Wolf Group's lien to be superior to
the interests of all appellees, except Maysonet Landscape Company's claim
of lien.724 The court agreed with the Wolf Group that their mortgage gained
priority over Maysonet through
the doctrine of equitable subrogation or
7
conventional subrogation. 25
Maysonet and the Spariosus entered into a contract for landscaping
materials and services for the property. 726 Maysonet filed and duly recorded
a claim of lien.7 27 At that time, two existing mortgages were already
recorded on the property. 728 A few months later, the Spariosus executed a
note and mortgage to City First Mortgage Corporation ("City"). 729 Two
prerequisites existed in order for the loan to go to the Spariosus as
borrowers. 73 First, the proceeds from City's loan were to be used to satisfy
the two previously recorded mortgages.73 Second, City's first mortgage
would be substituted in the place of the two prior mortgages. 732 City's
mortgage was later assigned to the Wolf Group.733
Maysonet sued the borrowers and recorded its notice of lis pendens.3
When the borrowers defaulted on the City's loan, Wolf Group sought to
foreclose the mortgage, and Maysonet was later named as a defendant in the
amended complaint.
The lower court entered a final judgment of
720. Id(quoting FLA. STAT. § 55.10(1) (1997)) (emphasis in original).

721. Id.
722. Id.
723. 706 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), cause dismissed,Maysonet Landscape
Co. v. Wolf (Fla. 1998).

724.
725.
726.
727.
728.

Id. at 882.
Id
Id.
Id.
Wolf, 706 So. 2d at 882.

729.
730.
731.
732.
733.
734.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id
Wolf, 706 So. 2d at 882.

Id.

735. Id.
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mortgage foreclosure finding the Wolf Group's interest superior to the
interests of all defendants except Maysonet.736
[S]ubrogation is the "substitution of one person to the position of
another with reference to a legal claim or right. The doctrine of
subrogation is generally invoked when one person has satisfied the
obligations of another and equity compels that the person
discharging the debt stand in the shoes of the person whose claim
has been discharged, thereby
succeeding to the rights and priorities
737
of the original creditor.,

The appellate court found that, under the doctrine of conventional
subrogation, the Wolf Group's lien should have been superior to Maysonet's
lien.
Evidence showed that the borrowers had an agreement with City for
the City mortgage to be substituted in place of the two prior mortgages.
Conventional subrogation... arises by virtue of an
agreement, express or implied, that a third person or one having
no previous interest in the matter involved shall, upon discharging
an obligation or paying a debt, be substituted in the place of the
creditor with respect to such rights, remedies,
or securities as [the
740
creditor] may have against the debtor.
The court concluded "that the Wolf Group's lien was entitled
' 741 to priority over
Maysonet's lien under the doctrine of conventional subrogation.
Zalay v. Ace Cabinets of Clearwater,Inc.7 42 The court affirmed final
judgment in a construction lien action filed by subcontractors and
materialmen. 743 Evidence supported the trial court's decision that all but one
of the claims were valid and timely, and created liens against the property. 744
In 1992, the Zalays contracted with Charles Walker Corporation to
build a home for $360,000. 745 Zalay had to make only one final payment in

736. Id. at 883.
737. Id. at 883 (quoting Eastern Nat'l Bank v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 508 So.
2d 1323, 1324 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
738. Wolf, 706 So. 2d at 884.
739. Id.
740. Id. at 883 (citing Foreman v. First Nat'l Bank, 79 So. 742,744 (1918)).
741. Id. at 884.
742. 700 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
743. Id. at 16.
744. Id.
745. Id.
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the amount of $45,267.07. 746 Although most of the work was completed on
the home, several subcontractors and materialmen remained unpaid.747 Three
lienors recorded claims totaling about $31,000, and Artistic Surfaces
presented an untimely claim for $2600. 48
The issue before the court was whether the language of section 713.06
of the Florida Statutes allows the attorneys' fees and costs ultimately
awarded under section 713.29 to become a lien against the property. 749 The
court concluded "that the limitation in section 713.06(3)(h) is intended to
define the extent of the lien for the lienor's materials or services prior to
litigation, and is not intended
'1 50to preclude a lien for costs and attorneys' fees
in a lien foreclosure action.
The court found it important to examine section 713.06(1) of the
FloridaStatutes.75 1 This statute provides:
A materialman or laborer, either of whom is not in privity with
the owner, or a subcontractor or sub-subcontractor who complies
with the provisions of this part and is subject to the limitations
thereof, has a lien on the realyroperty improved for any money that
is owed to him for labor ....
Nothing in this statute expressly provides a lien for attorneys' fees and
costs. 7
Construction lien statutes should not be liberally construed in favor
of any person. 7- 4 "[A]ttomeys' fees awarded under section 713.29 are not an
element of damages, but are 'taxed as part of... costs."' 755 The court saw
involved in a construction lien action should not be
no reason why the costs 756
included within the lien.
Legislative changes include, but are not limited to, the following: With
respect to public lands and property, section 255.05(2)(a) of the Florida
Statutes now provides that where a claimant is no longer furnishing labor on
a project, a contractor, its agent or attorney may elect to shorten the
prescribed time within which an action to enforce a claim against the

746. Id.
747. Zalay, 700 So. 2d at 16.

748. Id. at 17.
749. L
750. Id.
751. Id.
752. Zalay,700 So. 2d at 17 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.06(1) (1993)).

753. Id.
754. Id
755. Id. at 18 (omission in original).

756. Id.
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payment bond may be made.757 This may be done by filing a Notice of
Contest of Claim Against Payment Bond.
The form and procedure for
such are set out in the above referenced statute.759
Section 713.01(12) of the FloridaStatutes has been amended to include
in the definition of "improve," a provision for solid waste collection or
disposal on the site of the improvement.76 Likewise, the definitions for
"improvement," "subcontractor,"
and "sub-subcontractor" have been
76 1
amended to reflect the same.
Section 713.23(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes has been amended to
provide a shorter time for a contractor to claim against a payment bond.762
This statute provides a form for filing a "Notice of Contest of Claim Against
Payment Bond." Comparatively, section 713.235(1) of the Florida Statutes
provides
,,763 a form for a "Waiver of Right To Claim Against the Payment
Bond.

XVI. MORTGAGES

Alafaya Square Ass'n v. Great Western Bank.7 4 The court granted
appellee's motion for rehearing of the opinion dated February 7, 1997.765
The opinion was entered in place of the previous one.

766

The court reversed

the trial court's order appointing a receiver because there was no showing
that Alafaya wasted or impaired the real property. 767

Alafaya
owned a
768

shopping center encumbered by a mortgage in favor of WHC.
If there was
a default on the mortgage, Alafaya agreed to have a receiver appointed. 769
After the loan matured, Alafaya did in fact default on payment.770 In
responseWIHC sued to foreclose and requested the appointment of a
receiver.

757.
758.
759.
760.
761.
762.
763.
764.
765.
766.
767.
768.
769.
770.
771.

FLA. STAT. § 255.05(2)(a) (1999).

Id.
Id.
Id. § 713.01(12).
Id. § 713.01(14), (26), (27).
FLA. STAT. § 713.23(1)(e) (1999).
Id. § 713.235(1).
700 So. 2d 38 (Fia. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Alafaya, 700 So. 2d at 39.
Id.
Id.
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The trial court granted WHC's motion to sequester the rents received
from the shopping center's tenants. 772 All rent collected was placed in
escrow and Alafaya could not expend funds from the account without the
court's approval.7 3 Alafaya requested use of the escrow funds from WHC
to do repairs on the property. After Alafaya received no response, it
requested permission from the trial court to expend the funds77 4 Alafaya
later requested WHC's consent to withdraw escrow funds for payment of
real estate taxes. 775 WHC again failed to answer.!76 In response to Alafaya's
request for funds to repair, "WHC filed a motion
' 777 for appointment of receiver
alleging an 'apparent waste to the property. "'
The trial court granted WHC's motion for the appointment of a
receiver, and Alafaya appealed arguing that evidence failed to show Alafaya
wasted or impaired the property. 7 "The appointment of a receiver in a
foreclosure action is not a matter of right.., it is an extraordinary
remedy., 779 The receiver's role "is to preserve the value of the secured
property."780 The trial court can appoint a receiver, but only if evidence
suggests
that the secured property is being wasted or subject to serious risk
781
of loss.
The appellate court agreed that the evidence did not constitute waste or
impairment. 78 The only waste could be the disrepair to the parking lot and
the exterior paint.78 3 Alafaya took timely action to get WHC to release the
funds.7 4 As such, there could be no waste since the failure to repair was due
to WHC's refusal to release the funds. 78 5 The appellate
78 6 court reversed
because the facts did not justify the remedy of receivership.
787
Beach
Ocwen Federal
the
United
Statesv. Supreme
Court toBank.
consider Beach,
whetherthe
theborrowers,
three year asked
rescission
772. Id.

773. Id.
774. Alafaya, 700 So. 2d at 39.

775.
776.
777.
778.

Id.
Id.
Id.
M at 40.

779. Alfaya, 700 So. 2d at 40; see Barnett Bank of Alachua County v. Steinberg, 632 So.
2d 233, 234 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
780. Alfaya, 700 So. 2d at 40.
781. Id.; see Atco Constr. & Dev. Corp. v. Beneficial Say. Bank, 523 So. 2d 747, 750
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
782. Alfaya, 700 So. 2d at 40.

783.
784.
785.
786.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 41.

787. 523 U.S. 410 (1998).

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 24:267

period, under the Truth-in-Lending Act, precluded a right of action after a
specified time.788 If so, the borrowers would not be able to raise their right
to rescind under the act as a recoupment defense in a foreclosure action
brought by the lender more than three years after the loan transaction date.789
The Court found the language in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) to be clear, and held
that the right of rescission "shall expire" after the three year period.79
Therefore, it was not a statute of limitations and could not be raised as a
791
recoupment defense after the expiration.79
Blatchley v. Boatman's National Mortgage, Inc.792 The court affirmed
an order denying Blatchley's motion to vacate the foreclosure sale of his
home.7 93 The summary final judgment in foreclosure stated the sale date was
January 9, 1997.794 Boatman's moved for an order changing the sale date to
January 7, because January 9 was a "scrivener's error" and the published
,,795
"Notice of Foreclosure Sale contained the correct date of January 7 .
The
court granted the date change.796
However, Blatchley failed to receive notice of the new sale date until a
day after the actual sale took place. 79 In addition, Blatchley only received
Boatman's motion to change the date on January 10.798 Blatchley motioned
to vacate the sale, since he never received proper notice of the correct sale
date. 7 99 As such, he could not exercise his right of redemption or
reinstatement, nor could he participate in the sale or protect his property
interest. 800 The trial court denied the motion to vacate the sale, but gave
Blatchley fifteen days from the order date to pay the judgment amount.8s 1
Instead of taking advantage of the increased redemption period that was
offered, Blatchley filed a notice of appeal. 802
"Section 45.031 required that the final judgment of foreclosure specify
a day for the sale and that the notice of sale be published for two weeks, the
second of which publication 'shall be at least 5 days before the
788.
789.
790.
791.
792.
793.
794.
795.
796.
797.
798.
799.
800.
801.
802.

Id. at 410.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 418.
706 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 317.
Id.
IU.
Id.
Blatchley, 706 So. 2d at 317.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at317-18.
Blatchley, 706 So. 2d at 318.
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sale."' 80 3 The requirements of this statute were not satisfied.804 However,
even though Blatchley did not receive proper notice, the court remedied the
error by extending the redemption period.8s 1 "Foreclosure suits are governed
by equitable principles. '8 s 6 The trial court "did equity" by extending the
redemption period, and nothing would be accomplished by reversing for a
new judgment and sale date. 807
808
The Clearmans recovered a judgment for
Clearman v. Dalton.
$150,000 against the Daltons. 8s 9 The Daltons filed for bankruptcy and
revealed two secured mortgages against their homestead.810 The first was in
favor of their son in the amount of $15,000, and the second was in favor of
Monticello Bank for $50,000.811 The mortgage in favor of their son was
never recorded, while the bank's mortgage was recorded but not delivered. 2
The trustee obtained an order from the Bankruptcy Court avoiding the
mortgages, preserving the avoided obligations "for the benefit of the
estate."
The trustee assigned the mortgages to the Clearmans who
recorded the assignment and judments, avoiding the mortgages and
preserving the avoided obligations.
The trial court denied the foreclosure petition filed by Clearman. 15 The
appellate court agreed with the trial court that title 544 of the United States
Code did not place the trustee in the place of the former mortgagees with the
power to foreclose.8 6 The appellate court believed the bankruptcy estate
had an assignable interest in the mortgage subject to Daltons' claim of
homestead.8s 7 The assignees "can assert their interest and require the
Daltons to establish the fact of homestead."818 Filing of judgments entered
by the Bankruptcy Court does not constitute slander of title.81 9 Since the
Daltons deliberately filed their bankruptcy petition and submitted their
property, subject to provable exemptions, they cannot complain if the
803. Id. (quoting FLA.

STAT. § 45.031 (1997)).
804. Id.
805. Id.
806. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 702.01 (1995).

807. Blatchley, 706 So. 2d at 318.
808. 708 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
809. Id. at 325.

810.
811.
812.
813.
814.
815.
816.
817.
818.
819.

Id.
Id
Id.
Cleannan,708 So. 2d at 325.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 544.
Ckaman,708 So. 2d at 325.
Id.
Id.
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assignee of the estate's interest requires them to prove entitlement to
8
homestead exemption. 820
82
Crane v. Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County.821
The court affirmed
the amended final judgment as to the terms of rescission of the mortgage
agreement, except as to the effective date the rate of interest charged to the
borrower should run.8 2 The court reversed the denial of the borrower's
motion for partial summary judgment on liability, and vacated the provision
for foreclosure of the subject mortgage, if the 8borrower
failed to satisfy the
3
conditions for rescission within forty-five days. 2
The bank sought to foreclose when a construction loan matured and the
borrower's wife refused to sign a modification of their mortgage
agreement. 24 The borrower had not defaulted under the construction loan
phase of the agreement since the borrower's payments had been refused,
preventing such borrower from performing under the agreement.8s "[T]he
borrower's bank did not have a written agreement requiring the wife's
signature on the mortgage."8 26 Liability against the borrower
did not include
27
the wife's refusal to sign a modification to the mortgage.8
On appeal, the borrower claimed that the trial judge erred in denying his
motion for summary judgment because the borrower had offered to make
payments but was refused. 82 "The trial court should have granted the
borrower's motion for partial summary judgment .... [T]he bank's
complaint.., did not include allegations that the borrower defaulted by
failing to have his wife sign the mortgage modification... ,,829 The sole
basis for default was due to the borrower's failure to pay the mortgage. 830 As
such, no material issue of fact existed regarding the question of liability for
foreclosure.8 31
The second issue on appeal was whether the trial court's order
authorizing rescission "ab initio" of the parties' mortgage agreement
properly restored each party to the status quo.
"[T]he trial court erred in
assessing two different rates of interest as a condition for rescission of the
820.
821.
822.
823.
824.
825.
826.
827.
828.
829.
830.
831.
832.

l
698 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 905.
Id at 905-06.
Id. at 903.
Id.
Crane, 698 So. 2d at 903.
I at 903.
Id. at 904.
Ia
Id.
Crane, 698 So. 2d at 904.
Id.
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parties' agreement 'ab initio.'" 33 Since there was only one integrated
mortgage agreement and its nullification is ab initio, the borrower should not
be penalized with a higher interest rate. 34 This is especially true if it was
the bank's own refusal to accept payments that led to rescission, simply
because the mortgage agreement provided for two phases of the loan. 3 5
This court found no error in the imposition of a "costs of funds" rate of
interest and payment required by the borrower as a cost of rescission. 36 No
record established the basis for foreclosure within forty-five days if the
borrower failed to make rescission as required in the amended final
judgment. 837 Since "the trial judge erred in denying the borrower's motion
for partial summary judgment on the bank's action for foreclosure, there is
no basis for foreclosure under the mortgage agreement of the parties even if
the borrower is unable to restore the bank to status quo in 45 days. 838
"'[Floreclosure on an accelerated basis may be denied where.., payment
was not made due to... excusable neglect, coupled with some conduct of
the mortgagee which in a measure contributed to the failure to pay when
due.' ' ,839 Acceleration of the balance and foreclosure of the mortgage
agreement were declared premature on this record.m°
Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage Corp.841 The issue on appeal was
"whether a mortgage lender's payment of a 'yield spread premium' to a
mortgage broker violates the antikickback provision of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"). 842
The Culpeppers obtained a federally insured home mortgage loan from
the Inland Mortgage Corporation ("Inland").843 However, rather than dealing
directly with Inland, the Culpeppers dealt only with the mortgage broker,
Premiere Mortgage Company ("Premiere").
"On December 7, 1995,
Premiere received a rate sheet from Inland and informed the Culpeppers that
a 30-year loan was available at a 7.5% interest rate." 845 The Culpeppers
approved the given rate.846 However, the Culpeppers did not know that rate
833. Id.

834. Id.
835. Id
836. Crane, 698 So. 2d at 904-05.

837. I& at 905.
838. IM.
839. I& (quoting Campbell v. Werner, 232 So. 2d 252, 256-57 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App.
1970); Lunn Woods v. Lowery, 577 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
840. Crane,698 So. 2d at 905.
841. 132F.3d 692 (11th Cir. 1998).
842. Id. at 694; see 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994).
843. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 694.
844. Id.
845. Id.

846. Id.
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was higher than the par rate on Inland's 30-year loan, and it carried a yield
spread premium of 1.675% of the loan amount.847 Also, they did not know
that, as a result of the spread, Inland would be paying Premiere the premium
for the higher rate, even though the Culpeppers paid Premiere a loan
origination fee for assisting them in obtaining and closing their loan. 8 Once
the Culpeppers discovered this, they challenged the legitimacy of Inland's
yield spread premium payment under RESPA. 49
Noting that no federal circuit court had addressed this issue, and the
federal district courts that had addressed it were divided, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals presented its own analysis.850 In so doing, it
determined that the yield spread premium under these facts was a nonexempt
referral fee violating RESPA section 2607(a)." 1
The court's analysis began with the statutory prohibitions and
exemptions. 82 Section 2607(a) prohibits kickbacks and referral fees
pursuant to an agreement regarding federally related mortgages. 853 Section
2607(c) exempts from that prohibition payment for goods or services
actually performed.8 54
The first question was whether the payment to Premiere was a referral
fee. 855 The court noted that the payment would constitute such "if (1) a
payment of a thing of value is (2) made pursuant to an agreement to refer
settlement business and (3) a referral actually occurs."
Here, Inland gave
Premiere value by paying the spread premium.857 The payment was made
pursuant to an agreement to refer settlement business, because the premium
was to be paid for Premiere's "registered" loans with Inland which funded
the loans. 8 There was an actual referral when Premiere registered the loan
with Inland.859
The next question was whether section 2607(c) exempted the
transaction as a payment for goods or services. 8 60 As to whether there was a
payment for goods, the appellate court noted this was not satisfied, since
847. Id.
848. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 694.

849. Id.
850.
851.
852.
853.

854.
855.
856.
857.
858.
859.
860.

Id. at 695.
Id. at 695-96.
See id. at 695.
Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 695; see 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a).
Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 695; see § 2607(c).
See Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 695.
Id. at 696.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 696.
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Inland funded the loan from the beginning.861 It was not one owned by
Premiere and subsequently sold to Inland, which might be done with loans
sold in the permitted secondary mortgage market sales. 862 The court noted
that even if Premiere was selling to Inland its right to direct the loan's
disposition to a number of wholesale lenders, it would not be an exempt sale
of goods. 863 Paying a referral fee for "directing" the business, violates
RESPA, and the 864
court concluded that the premium did not fit the sale of
goods exemption.
As to whether the premium was paid for Premiere's services, the
appellate court first looked at the services Premiere provided the Culpeppers,
which included both obtaining and closing the loan.865 It found the facts
clearly showed the Culpeppers already paid Premiere for these services.866 It
also identified logically that the premium paid to Premiere for generating a
higher loan rate was not a service to the Culpeppers.867
Next, the court looked to whether the premium was for a service to
The
However, there was no additional service to Inland.
Inland.
premium was based solely on the higher interest rate.870 Premiere provided
no additional service to Inland above what it would have provided them with
a loan consisting of a lower interest rate. 871 Therefore, the payment did not
fit the sale of services exemption.872
Having found the transaction violated RESPA'sprohibitions, the court
The court noted the
reversed and remanded the case to the district court.
market value test utilized by the trial court was inappropriate, since that test
applies only to facially permissible transactions. 74 The appellate court
to consider the Culpeppers' motion for class
directed the trial court
875
certification ab initio.
Dove v. McCormick.876 The court affirmed the trial court's order
granting final summary judgment in favor of McCormick. 87 Dove executed
861.
862.
863.
864.
865.
866.
867.
868.
869.
870.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 696.
Id.
Id. at 696-97.
Id. at 697.
Id.
Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 697.

871.
872.
873.
874.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

875. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 697.
876. 698 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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a mortgage in favor of The First, F.A., that encumbered Orange County real
property.
The transaction was subject to The Truth in Lending Act,
("TILA") requirements.879 Afterwards, The First was declared "troubled,"
and the RTC was appointed as a receiver to liquidate The First's assets. 880
Dove's mortgage was assigned by RTC to Blazer Financial Services, which
later assigned the mortgage to McCormick.88 1 Since Dove failed to make
monthly payments, McCormick sued to foreclose. 882
The trial court entered final summary judgment in McCormick's favor,
concluding that Dove posed defenses pertaining to rescission and
recoupment which were barred by the statute of limitations. 883 "Dove sought
to assert her statutory right to rescission based upon alleged violations of
TILA and Regulation Z." 84 Dove also argued for recoupment under section
1640(e). 885 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling in denying
Dove's claim of rescission because "'under Florida law, an action for
statutory right of rescission pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1635 may not be revived
as a defense in recoupment
' 8 6 beyond the three-year expiration period
contained in section 1635(f). ' 1
Florida has historically recognized that "when the right and the remedy
are created by the same statute, the limitations of the remedy are treated as
limitations of the right. ' 8 7 The court reasoned that Dove may not seek the
remedy of rescission under the guise of an affirmative defense of
recoupment outside the statutory three-year time frame. 88
Floyd v. FederalNational Mortgage Ass'n.88 9 Floyd appealed a postjudgment final order denying the "Motion to Vacate Final Judgment and Set
Aside Foreclosure Sale." 8
The Federal National Mortgage Company
Association ("Federal National"), filed the complaint to foreclose a first
mortgage against Pamela Johnson. s91 The mortgage encumbering the home
877.
878.
879.
880.

Id. at 586.
Id
Id.
Id.

881. Dove, 698 So. 2d at 586.

882. Id.
883. Id.
884. Id. at 587.
885. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1994).
886. Dove, 698 So. 2d at 588 (quoting Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So. 2d 146, 153

(Fla. 1997), aff'd, 523 U.S. 410 (1998)).
887. Id. (quoting Bowery v. Babbit, 128 So. 801, 806 (1930)).
888. Id. at 588.
889. 704 So. 2d 1110 (Fla.5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
890. Id. at 1111.
891. Id.
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was executed by Pamela and her then husband, Vernon Floyd in the original
principal amount of $11,000. 8 92 After their divorce and Pamela's subsequent
death, Vernon resided in the home with their children.893 In the same year,
the mortgage went into default with a remaining balance of $3,045.96.s 9,r
Personal service of the complaint could not be completed because the
sheriff's process server was unable to locate the property. 95 The death of
Pamela was never confirmed.896 Federal National filed an amended
complaint naming Pamela Johnson or her heirs as the defendant.897 Federal
National then filed an Affidavit of Constructive Service alleging that the
heirs could not be found even after a diligent search was conducted.9 8
After a second letter was sent to Vernon, specifying the amount
necessary to reinstate the mortgage, the trial court entered final summary
judgment in favor of Federal National. s99 Vernon was notified to vacate the
premises after the foreclosure sale.9° In response, Vernon filed a motion to
set aside the foreclosure sale, which was consequently denied by the trial
court. 90

The appellate court agreed with Vernon that Federal National failed to
conduct a diligent search.
Prior to constructive notice, a plaintiff must
first file an affidavit showing that a diligent search was conducted to
discover the names and addresses of the defendants. 9 3 In this case, Federal
National's affidavit states that a search was conducted of the Social Security
Administration database, probate records, and Vital Statistics, all without
success. 9 4 The Social Security records confirmed that Pamela Johnson was,
in fact, deceased. 90 5 Federal National failed to locate the property, inquire of
those ingpossession of the property, or talk with neighbors, relatives or
friends.
Federal National's failure to pursue Vernon after his previous inquiries
about reinstating the mortgage showed that Federal National did not
892.
893.
894.
895.

Id.
Id.
Floyd, 704 So. 2d at 1111.
Il

896. Id.
897. Id.
898. Id
899. Floyd, 704 So. 2d at 1111.

900. Id.
901. Id.
902. Id. at 1112.
903.
904.
905.
906.

Id.; see FA. STAT. §§ 49.031(1), .041(1), .071 (1995).
Floyd, 704 So. 2d at 1112.
Id.
Id.
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"'reasonably employ[] the knowledge at [its] command.' 90 7 Federal
National failed to conduct a diligent search and inquiry required by the
constructive notice
statute, by completely ignoring the parties in possession
9
of the premises. 08
"Strict compliance with constructive service statutes is required." 9 9
The record showed a diligent effort was not made to acquire the information
needed to accomplish personal service on those in possession of the
property. 910 The appellate court believed Federal National would have
learned the additional facts necessary to accomplish personal service if
someone located the property and went there to see who actually had
possession. 91912
Kirkland v. Miller.
Kirkland appealed final judgment of ejectment
awarded in favor of Sportsmen's Resort Clubs Inc., ("Sportsmen's"), the
original owner of the subject real property.9 13 The trial court stated that
Kirkland only had a beneficial interest in an Illinois land trust.9914 Thus,
ejectment was a proper remedy.915 The trial court determined there was only
a personal property interest and foreclosure was unnecessary. 916 The
appellate court reversed.9 17
Miller was a trustee with legal and equitable title to the property
identified in the trust.918 Mary Shearer the principal, and Sportsmen's only
shareholder, had a beneficial interest.916 Miller explained the documents for
closing to Kirkland, which included a contract showing Sportsmen's sale of
the beneficial interest to Kirkland for $40,000.920 Kirkland executed a
security agreement which assigned the beneficial interest back to Miller as
security for the $40,000 debt recognized as a "Purchase Money Mortgage,"
and included a charge for "State Documentary Stamps on Deed.",921 Kirkland
907. Id. (quoting Batchin v. Barnett Bank of S.W. Fla., 647 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1994)).
908. Id.
909. Floyd, 704 So. 2d at 1112 (citing Tindal v.Vamer,667 So. 2d 890, 890-91 (Fla.2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
910. Id.
911. Id.at 1113.
912. 702 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997), review denied, 717 So. 2d 535 (Fla.
1998).
913. Id.
914. Id.
915. See id.
916. Id.
917. Kirkland, 702 So. 2d at 620.
918. Id.
919. Id.
920. Id.
921. Id.at 620-21.
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was to make monthly payments for twenty years, and if default occurred,
there would be an automatic assignment of the entire beneficial interest to
Sportsmen's. 922 After default, Miller was to sell the trust property, and after
costs and fees were paid out, the balance from the proceeds were to be
delivered to Kirkland. 923 Kirkland believed a mortgage was created. 924
Pursuant to section 697.01 of the FloridaStatutes, an instrument is said
to be a mortgage if, when taken either alone or in conjunction with the
surrounding facts, it seems to have been given for the purpose of securing
payment of the money. 925 "'Whenever property belonging to one person is
held by another as securit
'9 for an indebtedness of the other, the transaction
is in effect a mortgage.
The transaction in this case was not a valid Illinois land trust, but a
mortgage securing an indebtedness. 927 If there was default, Kirkland's
interest in the property reverted to Sportsmen's. 92s Accordingly, the transaction was deemed a mortgage, subject to the rules of foreclosure.29
Najera v. NationsBank Trust Co.930 Najera appeals from a final
summary judgment of foreclosure by NationsBank. 93 1 The appellate court
reversed the trial court's decision because it believed issues of material fact
remained 9on
2 the record which could not be disposed of by summary
judgment. 1
Najera's deposition showed that he requested a copy of the property
appraisal but never obtained it.933 General Development Corporation
("GDC") said it would take care of the appraisal because no bank would
authorize a loan for more money than the property value.934 Najera paid a
fee for the appraisal, with the understanding that it was being done in order
to verify that the property would
provide the lending institution with
935
sufficient collateral for the loan.

922. Kirkland, 702 So. 2d at 621.

923. Id.
924. IRt
925. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 697.01 (1985).
926. Kirkland, 702 So. 2d at 621 (quoting Williams v. Roundtree, 478 So. 2d 1171,

1173 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
927. Id.
928. Id.
929. Id. at 621-22.
930. 707 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, (Apr. 15, 1998).

931.
932.
933.
934.

Id. at 1154.
Id.
Id.
Id.

935. Najera,707 So. 2d at 1154.
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The appellate court believed "the allegations and record create[d] issues
of fact concerning whether the Najeras relied upon the existence of a
professional appraisal to support the loan values, and whether they would
have entered
into this transaction had those representations not been
9 36
made.
The record established much more than the assertion of inflated
93 7
values.
and General Development Financial Corporation, ("GDV")
collectivelyGDC
misrepresented
the value of the lot the Najeras already owned, the value of the
condo for which they were induced to swap the lot, the fact that
they were to have conventional financing... that the rental market
in the area was sufficiently strong to cover their mortgage
payments, that the resale market for GDC properties was strong at
the false sales prices, and that there existed and would be provided
a professional appraisal
to back up the value of the property
93
provided to them.

8

The appellate court recognized that if the alleged course of fraudulent
conduct by GDC and GDV was established at trial, and if it was shown that
it was reasonably relied
upon by Najeras, they would have a defense to the
939
foreclosure action.
Southeast & Associates v. Fox Run Homeowners' Ass'n.9 The issue
before the court was whether the owners may set aside a foreclosure sale
where constructive service was "based on affidavits of diligent search and
inquiry which 94were
facially sufficient and complied with the statutory
1
requirements."
On July 1, 1995, an association assessment for semi-annual
maintenance was due.9 2 Albert and Rose Love received a notice of
delinquency from the association.943 The notice stated that the association
could file a lien against the home and foreclose at a later date. 9 4 When the
Loves failed to pay the assessment, a lien was filed against the property. 945
The Loves paid a partial payment, which the association returned with a
936.
937.
938.
939.
940.
941.

Id. at 1155.
Id.
Id; see Watson v. Hahn, 664 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Najera,707 So. 2d at 1155.
704 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 695.

942. Id.
943. Id.
944. Id.
945. Southeast &Assocs., 704 So. 2d at 695.
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that if full payment was not made, a foreclosure suit would be
stating
notice
4
initiated.'
When the association planned to foreclose, it hired a process server to
serve the Loves. 947 The server failed to recognize that the Loves were at
their New York address and made numerous attempts to serve them at their
Fox Run address, as well as another Florida address said to be attributed to
them. 948 Since personal service was not able to be performed, the
association served by publication after filing an affidavit of diligent search
and an affidavit of constructive service. 94 "- Final summary judgment of
foreclosure was filed against the Loves.95 Southeast and Associates the
successful bidder at the foreclosure sale, received a certificate of title. In
response, the Loves moved to set aside the sale due to an insufficient service
of process.952 The trial court entered an order finding lack of diligent search
and inquiry by Fox Run, thereby setting aside the foreclosure sale. 53
Section 49.041 of the Florida Statutes "provides that a person may be
served by publication upon verified statement showing on its face that
'diligent search and inquiry have been made to discover the name and
residence' of the person being served." 954 If the court finds the verified
statement to be defective, or considers the diligent search to be deficient, the
court must then decide "'whether the trial court's judgment of foreclosure
would be void or voidable."'9 5 5 If voidable, a foreclosure sale resulting 9from
56
constructive service cannot be set aside as against a bona fide purchaser.
The plaintiff here followed the favored approach. 95 7 It filed a detailed
affidavit which listed the various attempts to deliver personal service, "the
contact with the neighbors, the two skip traces, and the trip to a retail
establishment where the process server learned the lessee had moved out in
the middle of the night.
In addition, "'where one of two innocent parties must suffer a loss as
the result of the default of another, the loss shall fall on the party who is best
946. Id.

947. Id.
948. Id.
949. Id
950. Southeast &Assocs., 704 So. 2d at 695.

951.
952.
953.
954.

Id. at 695-96.
Id. at 696.
Id.
Id.

955. Southeast &Assocs., 704 So. 2d at 696 (quoting Batchin v. Barnett Bank of S.W.
Fla., 647 So. 2d 211,213 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).

956. Id.
957. Id.
958. Id.
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able to avert the loss and is the least innocent. ' '9 59 The Loves did not make
the requisite maintenance payment and could have informed the Association
of their move to New York.
In addition, someone on the
961 Loves' behalf
kept signing the certified letters and made partialpayments.
United Companies Lending v. Abercrombie. 62 The issue presented was
whether the "circuit court abused its discretion when it declined to set aside
a mortgage foreclosure sale of real property." 963 The appellate court held
that the circuit court
964was mistaken in its view of what its scope of discretion
is in such a matter.
The United Companies Lending Corporation ("United") sued to
foreclose its mortgage on the residence owned by the appellee. 965 The circuit
court entered a final judgment and subsequently scheduled a foreclosure sale
to be held at the Sarasota County Courthouse. 9 56 United's counsel agreed to
attend the sale, but due to an illness in the original attorney's family, United
sent another attorney to appear in his place. 67 The replacement attorney
arrived early for the foreclosure sale, however, he was at the wrong
courthouse.
He was informed that it was to be held in Sarasota only five
minutes before the sale was to take place. 969 The clerk in Sarasota "declined
his request to delay the bidding."
By the time a substitute Sarasota
attorney971arrived, the property had already been sold to Darrell Crane for
$1000.

United filed an objection to the sale and a motion to have the sale set
aside on the grounds of "gross inadequacy of price and the mistaken failure
of its agent to attend. 972 Evidence at the hearing proved that the property
was worth over $125,000 and that United was going to bid as high as
$181,898. 973 The successful
bidder, Crane, testified that he would have only
974
bid up to $115,00.
959.
1987)).
960.
961.
962.
963.
964.
965.
966.
967.
968.
969.
970.
971.
972.
973.
974.

Id. at 697 (quoting Jones v. Lally, 511 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
Southeast &Assocs., 704 So. 2d at 697.
Id.
713 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 1018.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United Cos. Lending, 713 So. 2d at 1018.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United Cos. Lending, 713 So. 2d at 1018.
Id.
Id.
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The circuit court found that the price paid for the property at the sale
was "grossly disproportionate. 975 However, it denied United's motion,
because the court found that the inadequate price resulted from the
"unilateral mistake" of United's counsel, "and not from any mistake,
misconduct, or irregularity" on the part of anyone else involved in the
sale.9 7 6 The circuit court cited Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Martin977 and
Sulkowski v. Sulkowski 978 for authority. 9 The appellate court upon
reviewing the transcript from the circuit court found that the circuit court
mistakenly believed that the Second District, unlike the Third and Fourth
Districts, holds that a mistake cannot be a unilateral mistake by the
complaining party.98° However, the law of this appellate district does not
differ from the other districts, and follows the holding in Art v. Buchanan.98 1
In Arlt, the court stated the general rule that:
standing alone mere inadequacy of price is not a ground for setting
aside a judicial sale. But where the inadequacy is gross and is
shown to result from any mistake, accident, surprise, fraud,
misconduct or irregularity upon the part of either the purchaser or
other person connected with the sale, with resulting injustice 982
to the
complaining party, equity will act to prevent the wrong result.
This court does not construe "person connected with the sale" to mean
that it has to be a person who was physically present at the sale. 983 Therefore,
the circuit court mistakenly read this court's past opinions to the contrary.984
"Whether the complaining party has made the showing necessary to set
aside a [foreclosure] sale is a discretionary decision by the trial court, which
may be reversed only when the court has grossly abused its discretion. 985
This court found that, in the present case, the circuit court's discretion was
restricted by a mistaken understanding of the law in this district, and

975.
976.
977.
1993).
978.
979.

Id.
Id.
605 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), case dismissed, 613 So. 2d 13 (Fla.
561 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
United Cos. Lending, 713 So. 2d at 1018.

980. Id.
981. 190 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1966).
982. Ia at 577.
983. United Cos. Lending, 713 So. 2d at 1019.

984. Id.
985. Id. at 1018 (citing RSR Invs., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Pinellas County, 647 So. 2d
874 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
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reversed and remanded for a reconsideration. 986 This court states no
"opinion as to the balance of equities in this case." 987 Rather, the court
stated that "[i]n one set of circumstances, the fact that the inadequate sale
price was caused by the complaining party's own mistake might tip the
balance of equities in favor of the successful bidder; in another case, it might
not. 988
XVII. OPTIONS AND RIGHTS OF FIRST REFUSA

9 89

Gonzalez v. Archer.990 When the tenant tried to exercise the purchase
option contained in the commercial lease, the seller claimed that the option
991
had been nullified by the tenant's default in making late rent payments.
The tenant then brought this action for specific performance.
The trial
court denied relief, but the Third District Court of Appeal reversed because
the record revealed that the landlord had accepted the untimely rent
payments without protest, and had, therefore, impliedly waived the right to
declare the lease in default based on those breaches. 993 The court also
invoked estoppel to prevent994the landlord from declaring the lease in default
under these circumstances.
The court rejected the defense that the tenant had failed to pay the
deposits required upon exercising the option.9 95 The lease did not specify
when the deposits had to be paid, and in the absence of an express term, the
tenant had a reasonable time to comply, but the landlord had repudiated the
option before a reasonable time had passed.996 The tenant was not required
to make a tender that the landlord already indicated would be refused.
998
River
Club, organization
Inc. v. Bagg.created
ThetoIndian
River
Colony
Club Indian
("Club")
wasColony
a nonprofit
provide
benefits
to

986. Id.
987. Id.
988. United Cos. Lending, 713 So. 2d at 1018.
989. Rights of first refusal and, for that matter, rights of first sale, are merely options that
are subject to conditions precedent. See Ronald Benton Brown, An Examination of Real Estate
PurchaseOptions, 12 NOVAL. REV. 147, 172 (1987).
990. 718 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, (Oct. 14, 1998).
991. Id. at 890.
992. Id. at 889.
993. Id.
994. Id. at 890.
995. Gonzalez, 718 So. 2d at 890.
996. Id.
997. Id.
998. 727 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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former military officers. 999 One of the benefits of membership was the
ability to buy a residence in the Club's planned unit development. 100°
However, under the deed restrictions, nonmembers were unable to purchase
a unit. 100 1 Furthermore, if an owner decided to sell, the residence had to be
sold at a price agreed to when the unit was first acquired, and to another
Club member on the waiting list. 002 If a Club member wanted to buy the
unit, the Club was required to sell it at the agreed price. 100 3 The Baggs
claimed that these restrictions violated the rule against restraints on
alienation. 1 '°4 The trial court agreed, based upon the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision in Inglehartv. Phillips°°1005 which invalidated a fixed price
repurchase option of unlimited duration.1
The Fifth District Court of Appeal disagreed, distinguishing Inglehart
on the critical facts. 0 07 The rule against restraints on alienation does not
prohibit all restrictions that prevent sale of land on the open market. 00 8 The
rule prohibits only unreasonable restraints.1° 9 The restriction in Inglehart
had no stated purpose and the court found it would have a significant
negative impact on the likelihood that the property would be improved, and
on its general marketability.'010 In contrast, the restrictions in this case were
shown not to have the same degree of negative impact.1011 To the contrary,
the restrictions were part of a rational plan to ensure continued success of
the organization, and the planned unit development.
Declaring the
restrictions invalid would undermine the legitimate objectives of the
members of the association.101 The dissent considered the case "squarely
controlled by Inglehart."'0 13 The critical factor, in the dissent's opinion, was
that there was no provision for an increase in the value of the property
between purchase and resale.10 1 4 The dissent would, however, have allowed

999. Id. at 1144.
1000.Id.
1001.Id.
1002. Id.
1003.Bagg, 727 So. 2d at 1144.
1004. Id.
1005.383 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1980).
1006.Bagg, 727 So. 2d at 1145.

1007. Id.
1008. Id. at 1145-46.
1009.Id.
1010. Id. at 1146.
1011.Bagg,727 So. 2d at 1146.
1012.Id.
1013.Id. at 1146 (Thompson, J.,
dissenting).

1014.Id. at 1146.
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the Club to seek relief
based upon equitable principles for the loss of the
0 15
benefit of its bargain.
Taylor v. Ceser . 16 Defendant was the trustee and executor of the
property in dispute. 1U 7 As such, he had the power to sell or grant an option
on the land.1° g Cesery decided to sell the residence, but first offered it to
one of the beneficiaries. 10 19 When the beneficiary did not accept the offer,
the defendant gave her "a right of first refusal."''1 0 He later received an
offer from a third party and notified the beneficiary. °02 The beneficiary
proposed that she receive the house in lieu of her cash distribution under the
will. 10 22 When the defendant rejected that roposal, the beneficiary brought
this suit and filed a notice of lis pendens. 0
The trial court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.
The
First District Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the preliminary
injunction, reasoning that the plaintiff had no likelihood of ultimate success
on the merits.102 The claim was based upon having exercised the right of
first refusal, but a matching cash offer was never made by the third party. 10 26
Taking the house in lieu0 27of a distribution from the estate was not the
equivalent of a cash offer.'
XVIII. RIPARIAN RIGHTS
Lee v. Williams.'028 This court resolved the issue of whether the
appellant had a right to construct a boat lift, by looking at which neighbor
owns the nonnavigable tidelands of Florida.'0 29- In Lee, the two neighbors'
1015. Id. at 1147.
1016.717 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1017. Id. at 1113.
1018.Id.
1019. Id.
1020. Id.
1021. Taylor,717 So. 2d at 1113.
1022. Id.at 1114.
1023. Id.
1024. Id. Plaintiff also filed a notice of lispendens which the trial court ordered
discharged. The district court reversed because there were issues remaining in the litigation that
might affect the title. Consequently, the third party would take title subject to the ultimate
outcome of this litigation. Id. at 1114-15.
1025. Taylor,717 So. 2d at 1114.
1026. Id.
1027. Id.
1028.711 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 722 So. 2d 193 (Fla.
1998).
1029. Id. at 57.
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lots were contiguous.' °3° The western boundary of the Williams' lot, Lot 13,
was defined as the centerline of Butler's Branch, a small waterway shown on
the plat of Butler's Replat, and the Lees' northern boundary of their lot, Lot
12, was Julington Creek, a navigable body of water. 10 31 The waters of
Butler's
and Julington Creek joined at the northwest end of the Lees'
I s
property.Branch
poe*1032

In 1960, the owner of Lot 13 excavated a navigable canal to run through
and across Lot 13, and through and across the conflux of Butler's Branch
and Julington Creek and into Julington Creek. 1033 In 1961, when the
Williams purchased Lot 13, the canal had been excavated. 1034 If in 1961, the
boat lift had been erected where it is today, it would have been over dry
land. 1035 Over the years, the canal bank eroded toward the common
boundary line, and in the 1980's the owner of Lot 12 constructed a bulkhead
along the, then existing, bank of the canal.10 36 Surveys show that a great
portion of this bulkhead was built on Lot 13.1037
In 1993, the Lees purchased Lot 12, and without the Williams'
knowledge, constructed a boat lift in the canal adjoining the previously
constructed bulkhead sometime in 1994.
The boat lift was situated
entirely within Lot 13, and the Williams, upon discovering this, protested the
construction of the boat lift.103 9
The issue facing this court was whether the canal, which traverses
nonnavigable tidelands within the Williams' lot, was privately owned by the
Williams, or was sovereignty land available for public use. 1°4° The trial
court found that Clement v. Watson1 0 1 was dispositive.'0 2 In Clement, the
court found that Watson was able to exclude Clement from fishing privileges
in a cove surrounded by property owned by Watson's wife. 104 3 The Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed the basis of the decision in Clement, when it
defined navigable waters and "emphasized that waters are not navigable

1030. Id.
1031. Id. at 57-58.
1032. Id. at 58.
1033. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 58.
1034. Id.
1035. Id.
1036.Id.
1037. Id.
1038. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 58.
1039. Id.
1040. Id.
1041.58 So. 25 (Fa. 1912).
1042.Lee, 711 So. 2d at 58.
1043. Id.
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merely because they are affected by the tides."' ' 4 The court distinguished
between sovereignty and privately owned lands as follows:
"The shore of navigable waters which the sovereign holds for
public uses is the land that borders on navigable waters and lies
between ordinary high and ordinary low water mark This does not
include lands that do not immediately border on the navigable
waters, and that are covered by water not capable of navigation

for useful public purposes, such as mud flats, shallow inlets, and
lowlands covered more or less by water permanently or at
intervals, where the waters thereon are not in their ordinary state
useful for public navigation. Lands not covered by navigable
waters and not included in the shore space between ordinary high
and low water marks immediately bordering on navigable waters
are the subjects of private ownership, at least when the public
1 45
rights of navigation, etc., are not thereby unlawfully impaired."'
The court concluded in Clement that a majority of states, including Florida,
base the determination on whether water is navigable and not upon whether
water is tidal. 1046 The appellants, however, argued that reliance on Clement
was an error and that the 1988 decision by the United States Supreme Court
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi' 47 governed.' 04 The appellants
1 49
concluded that all of Florida's tidelands are sovereignty lands of the state. 0
In Phillips Petroleum, the United States Supreme Court held that the states,
"upon entry into the Union, received ownership of all lands under waters
subject to the daily tidal ebb and flow."' 0 50 However, the Court also held
"that the states have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in
public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit."'10 5
This court looked to see how Florida law defined the limits of the lands
held in public trust, and what private rights in tidelands that Florida
recognizes. 052 No Supreme Court of Florida case has overruled Clements,
1 53
nor has any case held a nonnavigable tideland to be sovereignty land. 0
1044. Id.
1045.Id. at 59 (quoting Clement v. Watson, 58 So. 25, 26 (Fla. 1912)) (emphasis in

original).
1046. Id.
1047.484 U.S. 469 (1988).
1048. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 59.

1049. Id. at 60.
1050. Id.

1051. Id.
1052. Id.
1053. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 62.
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Therefore, the appellate court
affirmed the trial courts decision that the land
10 54
land.
sovereignty
be
to
not
is
XIX. SALES
Anchor Bank, S.S.B. v. Conrardy.1 55 Condominium buyers brought an
action for damages for fraud and rescission based on claims that the seller
had made fraudulent representations and failed to disclose known
construction defects.'056 The two claims were tried together. The court
granted a directed verdict for the defendant on the fraud claim due to
"deficiencies in proof as to the 1057
tort damages," but then granted rescission
based on fraud in the inducement.
Two points on appeal were noteworthy. First, the seller claimed that
the buyers had an adequate remedy at law, so they should be denied any
equitable relief.1058 The crux of this argument seems to be based on the fact
that the buyers could not simultaneously bring the tort suit without
undermining their claim for rescission.105 9 The district court rejected that
argument because the Supreme Court of Florida allowed such joinder in
Johnson v. Davis.'6 The seller also seemed to be arguing that losing the
tort suit should bar the claim for rescission, but that argument was rejected
because the elements for establishing damages for 6fraud
were not the same
1
as those for rescission for fraudulent concealment.10
The seller also claimed that rescission should not be granted because
the buyers could not restore the property to its condition at the time of the
sale, as is ordinarily required.1 62 The exception to the general rule is where
restoration is prevented by the very fraud from which the victim seeks
relief.
The exception applied in this case because the deterioration was
caused b the structural problems that the seller had failed to disclose to the
buyers.

1054. Id. at 64.
1055.23 Fla. L. Weekly D1764 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

1056. Id.
1057. Id.
1058. Id.
1059. Id.
1060.AnchorBank, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D1764 (citing Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625
(Fla. 1985)).

1061.Id.
1062. Id.
1063.Id.
1064. Id.
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Beach Higher Power Corp. v. Granados.10 65 The Buyer signed a
'
contract to purchase a condominium unit "as is.
1066 The contract called for
closing within sixty days but the buyer paid the entire purchase price at the
time of signing the contract. 0 67 Over fifteen months later, the buyer still did
not have title despite repeated demands, and he thereafter filed this suit for
specific performance and breach of contract.1°68 He alleged 1069
that the seller
had been using the unit during that period and had damaged it.
Before the seller had filed its answer the trial court granted the buyer's
motion for partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claim.
In
support of the motion, the buyer had filed an affidavit which incorporated by
reference a letter from the seller's attorney claiming the buyer had gotten the
unit at a bargain price because he had orally agreed to allow the seller to use
07
the unit as a sales office and model until all the other units
07 2 had been sold.1 1
agreement.1
such
any
denied
The buyer, in his affidavit,
The district court concluded that the partial summary judgment should
not have been granted. 07 3 Summary judgment should only be granted before
an answer has been filed where it appears that no genuine issue or defense
could possibly be raised by the answer. 107 4 Here, at least one possible
defense existed. The written contract could have been modified by a
subsequent oral agreement, or the conduct of the parties, even if that was
prohibited by an express term in the contract. 07 5" The buyer's affidavit
reveals that there was a dispute about the existence of an agreement under
which seller could use the unit.107 6 If there was such a valid modification,
then seller might not have breached the contract. Consequently,
the motion
07
should not have been granted at this stage of the proceedings.1
°78
Bush v.
Ayer.
land 107and
the agreement
buyer wereinlocated
in was
Florida,
but
9 An
the sellers
were
locatedThe
in Ohio.
principle
reached

1065.717 So. 2d 563 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, (Sept. 23, 1998).
1066. Id. at 564.
1067. Id.
1068. Id.
1069. Id.
1070. Granados,717 So. 2d at 564.
1071. Id.
1072. Id.
1073. Id.
1074. Id. at 565.
1075. Granados,717 So. 2d at 565.
1076. Id.
1077. Id.
1078.728 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, Ayer v. Bush, 744 So.
2d 452 (Fla. 1999).
1079. Id. at 800.
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during a telephone conversation.10 80 The buyer instructed his attorney to
draft the contract and mail it to the sellers.0 81 After reviewing the contract,
the sellers wanted one change.1082 They wanted the buyer to pay the closing
costs.10 s3 They hand wrote their modifications onto the draft, signed it, and
then faxed it to their attorney.10 4 Their attorney mailed the fax to the buyer
with a cover letter that stated:
Please forward these counter-offers to your client, Mr. Bush, and
explain the changes. If he is willing to consider the terms proposed
by my clients, then please contact me and I will deliver the original
signed contracts to your office for [your] review and execution.
Once there is a complete bilateral contract
... then we can discuss
108 5
making preparations for the closing.
That procedure was not followed. 10 6 The original contract that the
buyer had sent to the sellers was never delivered back to the buyer's attorney
for review and execution, as the cover letter required for the completing of a
bilateral contract. 0 87 The buyer simply went to his attorney's office and
agreed to the changes. 088 He then signed the fax copy of the contract that
his attorney had received.108 9 The buyer's attorney communicated those
facts to the sellers and their attorney, and further stated that he was taking
the contract to a title company so that the closing documents could be
prepared.1°9° The title company sent the closing documents, including
closing statements and proposed deeds, to the sellers.10 91 . The sellers
objected to the tax prorations, but that was worked out.1°92 Anticipating
closing, the buyer delivered checks to the title company. 0 93 A further
dispute broke out regarding minor discrepancies in the names of the
sellers. 1094 Apparently frustrated over the delays, the sellers attempted to
1080. Id.
1081. Id.
1082. Id.
1083. Bush, 728 So. 2d at 800.
1084. Id.

1085. Id.
1086. Id. at 801.
1087. Id.
1088.Bush,728 So. 2d at 800-01.
1089. Id. at 801.
1090. Id.
1091.Id.
1092. Id.
1093. Bush, 728 So. 2d at 801.
1094. Id. at 802.
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rescind the contract, offering to return the buyer's deposit. 0 95 The buyer
responded with the threat of a lawsuit."' 96 Attempting to resolve the matter,
the sellers' attorney stated, "Mr. and Mrs. Ayer are willing to meet their97
contractual requirements to sell Lot 13; however, there is a problem."'
When the negotiations again broke down, the sellers claimed, for the first
time, that there was no contract
because the buyer had never properly
98
accepted the counteroffer.1
The trial court agreed with the sellers and found that there was no
contracL.) 99 The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed and reversed. 1"0
While the counteroffer required acceptance in a particular manner, strict
compliance with those terms could be waived expressly or impliedly."O'
Reviewing the facts, the district court found:
Prior to the date set for closing, the parties had proceeded in all
respects as if a valid contract existed for the sale of Lot 13.
[Sellers] did not simply fail to assert to the contrary-they actively
conducted themselves in a manner that left no room for a
reasonable inference to the contrary. It would be difficult to
imagine a much stronger showing of waiver by conduct than that
made in this record. We conclude that the only reasonable
inference to be drawn from the undisputed evidence ... is that they
waived strict compliance with the designated manner of acceptance
of their counter-offer.1102
The trial court had concluded otherwise. Because the facts were not in
dispute, its findings were in the nature of a legal conclusion."03 Thus, the
district court was not required to defer to the trial court's findings.
Midtown Realty, Inc. v. Hussain.'1 4 The buyer sent a signed "Letter of
Intent" to the sellers containing a proposal for the purchase of a gas
station.1105 It included terms such as the proposed purchase price, financing
plans, and an inspection period. It further provided, "[i]f these TERMS and
CONDITIONS are acceptable to the Seller, Purchaser shall present to the
1095. Id.
1096. Id.
1097. Id.
1098. Bush, 728 So. 2d at 802.
1099. Id.
1100. Id.
1101. Id. at 801.
1102. Id. at 802.
1103. Bush, 728 So. 2d at 802.
1104.712 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1105. Id. at 1250.
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Seller a more detailed and formal Purchase Agreement."" 6 Before signing
the letter of intent, the sellers' representative changed and added
terms.11 0 7 In response, the buyer sent a signed Purchase and Sale Agreement
to the sellers. 1r 8 The sellers responded by making several changes,
executing it and sending it back to the buyer.
The buyer notified the
sellers that he could not agree to two of the changes the Sellers had made,
and that unless an agreement could be reached on these points, the
transaction could not be consummated."1 10 An agreement could not be
reached and the sellers withdrew the property from the market.,
The buyer then brought this suit for breach of contract.111 2 The sellers'
defense was that there was no contract1 3 The trial court dismissed the case
and the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.' 4 In order to have a
contract, there must have been a meeting of the minds on the essential
elements of the agreement. Several factors led the court to conclude that no
contract existed. First, a letter of intent is customarily used to memorialize a
preliminary understanding, rather than a contract.111 Second, this letter of
intent included language making it clear that it was merely a proposal
intended to further negotiations, rather than an offer.1 6 The sale of a gas
station, necessarily involving many complicated details, such as
environmental matters, licensing, permits and financing, would ordinarily be
reduced to a detailed contract, rather than a brief document like the letter of
intent.1117 Furthermore, the buyer himself had stated that the transaction
could not be consummated unless agreement could be reached on points not
resolved by the letter of intent.111 8
Pressman v. Wolf.111 9 The buyer signed a contract that provided the
central air conditioning, refrigerator, washer/dryer, hot water heater, stove

1106. Id.
1107. Id.
1108. Id. at 1251.
1109.Hussain,712 So. 2d at 1251.

1110.Id.
1111.Id.

1112.Id.
1113.Id.
1114. Hussain, 712 So. 2d at 1251. The claim of the broker operating under an open listing
contract was also dismissed and that was also affirmed by the district court. Id.
1115. Id. at 1252.
1116. Id.

1117.Id.
1118.Hussain, 712 So. 2d at 1252.
1119.732 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, Wolf v. Pressman, 744
So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1999).
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top and existing fixtures were "ALL IN 'AS IS' CONDITION."11 20 The
standard term warranting the septic tank, pool, major appliances, plumbing,
and machinery to be in working condition was crossed out.I1 21 The contract
also provided that the buyer waived any defects not reported at least ten days
before the closing. 1122 Furthermore, the contract provided the standard
integration term that, "[n]o prior or present agreements or representations
shall be binding upon [B]uyer or [S]eller unless included in this
contract." 1123 The buyer was clearly aware of these terms, but made a
"business decision" to accept against the advice of her attorney. 1
Before closing, the buyer's inspectors warned her that the true extent of
the problems could not be determined without further testing." 2
They
warned her that there were reasons to be concerned about the home's
structural integrity, whether the air conditioning system worked, and the
presence of termites.
Furthermore, there were reasons to suspect that the
pool leaked, or worse. 1127 The buyer, however, decided to close anyway. H 2
She later claimed that she went through with the closing because the sellers
represented that a city owned building obstructing the view would be torn
down and that a person they knew, Mr. Cruz, would be able to renovate the
home for only $100,000.1129
The buyer quickly became dissatisfied with Mr. Cruz's work, and fired
him. ' 30 After spending $225,000 on repairs, with the end not in sight, she
became dissatisfied with
1131her purchase and brought this suit claiming breach
of contract and fraud.
The trial court awarded her compensatory
and
132
punitive damages, but the Third District Court of Appeal reversed.'
The Third District considered the contract as a whole, rather than rely33
ing
on
found both
that the
agreement
sell repair.11
the home
34
"as is," isolated
with no terms.1
warranties It
because
parties
knew it was
was to
in bad

1120. Id. at 358 (The capitalization for emphasis reflects the way the term was typed into

the contract).
1121.Id.
1122. Id.
1123.Id.
1124. Pressman,732 So. 2d at 358.
1125.Id.
1126. Id. at 358-59.
1127. Id. at 359.
1128.Id.
1129. Pressman, 732 So. 2d at 359.
1130.Id.
1131.Id.
1132. Id. at 357.
1133. Id. at 360.
1134. Pressman, 732 So. 2d at 360.
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Thus, there could be no recovery for breach of contract.1 1 35 Nor could there
be recovery for fraudulent misrepresentation based on Johnson v. Davis
because that only gave relief from the seller's failure to disclose defects that
"are not readily observable and are not known to the buyer."'1 36 Not only
were hints of these defects observable, but then37buyer was warned by the
terms of the contract and by her own inspectors.
The buyer could also not recover based upon claims that she was misled
by the sellers' statement that the property could be renovated for $100,000,
or that the publicly owned building would be torn down. 1 1 The buyer could
not rely upon an obviously unreliable statement, she still had the duty to take
reasonable steps to ascertain the material facts relating to the property 13 9 In
light of the seller's disclaimers and the warnings of her inspectors, she could
n4
not have reasonably relied upon such an unsupported estimate1 0
Furthermore, she should have known that the plans of a government might
change 1 so she could not rely upon its unconfirmed plans to tear the building
down.1 41

Finally, any claims that the buyer had been fraudulently induced to
enter this contract were barred by the economic loss doctrine. 114 2 Any
representation about the condition of the land was inseparably embodied in
the parties' subsequent agreement. 14 Consequently, she could not recover
damages for purely economic injury.'144
Spitale v. Smith."4
The buyer brought an action for, inter alia,
fraudulent nondisclosure of construction defects.'1 46 The seller was the first
owner of the home, but had never occupied it.1 47 As the landlord, he had
received a letter from the tenant to the seller specifing some minor
problems, including water leaks above the garage door.11 The tenant later
testified that the leak over the garage
door was the only one.1149 The seller
50
hired a roofer to repair that leak."
1135.Id.

1136. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985)).
1137. See id.
1138.Id. at 361.
1139. Pressman,732 So. 2d at 361.
1140.Id.
1141.Id.
1142.Id.
1143.Id.
1144.Pressman,732 So. 2d at 362.

1145.721 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, (Nov. 12, 1998).
1146. Id. at 342.
1147.Id.
1148. Id. at 343.
1149.Id.
1150. Spitale, 721 So. 2d at 344.
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During the four years after the closing, the buyer experienced repeated
problems with the roof and had it repaired a number of times.'1 ' Following
a bench trial, judgment was entered for the buyer, but the district court
reversed.' 52 "Johnson [v. Davis] does not convert a seller of a house into a
guarantor of the condition of the house." 1 3 What it did hold was that
"where the seller of a home knows of facts materially affecting the value of
the property which are not readily observable and are not known to the
buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer."' 54 In this
case, there simply was insufficient evidence that the
5 5 seller knew of facts that
would materially affect the value of the property.1
Tiburon Ltd. v. Minola, Inc.1 56 The buyer contracted to buy fifty acres
of an approved development of almost eight hundred acres.11 57 The contract
of sale included a clause that required the recording of a covenant at closing
that would obligate the buyer to pay its pro rata share of the construction,
operation, maintenance, and repair of the water management system for the
entire development.'1 58 The parties' engineers were to jointly determine
what that pro rata share would be, but if no agreement could be reached,
"such issue shall be submitted to binding arbitration.""159 The clause also
provided that the buyer's share would not exceed $265,000.1160
Subsequently, the buyer signed an option to purchase up to an
additional twenty-four acres adjacent to the original fifty. 11 The buyer
assigned its rights to a related entity, which we will identify as Buyer-2, who
went through with the purchase 1 62 Buyer-2 exercised the option and the
parties proceeded to closing.' 63 Because they could not agree on Buyer-2's
pro rata share of the costs of the water management system for its combined
purchases, they entered into an escrow agreement.1 1 64 It provided that
Buyer-2 would deposit $395,000 in escrow as its maximum obligation, and
the exact amount would be determined by an arbitrator.1 65 The $395,000
1151.1d.
1152. Id. at 345.
1153. Id. (citing Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985)).
1154. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1986)).
1155. Spitale, 721 So. 2d at 345.
1156.730 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (Apr. 22, 1999).
1157.3d.
1158.1d.
1159.Id.
1160.Id.

1161. Tiburon Ltd., 730 So. 2d at 754.
1162. Id. at 755.

1163.Id.
1164. Id.
1165.Id.
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represented an increase of its original $265,000 maximum proportional to
the greater amount of land it was now purchasing. 66
Buyer and Buyer-2 during arbitration tried to collect from the seller its
pro rata share of the cost of the water management system.1 67 The seller
objected on the grounds that imposing liability on the seller was beyond the
scope of the arbitration to which they had agreed. 1168 The trial court agreed,
as did the district court. 1169 The arbitration clause, as interpreted by looking
at all the documents, clearly was limited to the question of what share of
these costs buyer would have to pay. 1170 While that necessarily involved
calculating the total cost of the system, it did not extend to the question of
the seller's
responsibility for costs incurred by the buyer in regard to the
system.1171 The court acknowledged that the buyer and Buyer-2 might have
a cause of action against the seller for contribution to the cost of the 11
water
72
management system, but pointed out that issue was not before the court.
XX. SLANDER OF TITLE

Clearman v. Dalton.1173 This opinion resulted from a motion for
rehearing or clarification.1 74 The Clearmans sought rehearing of the court's
unpublished order that granted the Clearmans attorneys' fees. 175 This court
withdrew the previous opinion and the order awarding
11 7 - the Clearmans
appellate fees and substituted the following information.
The Clearmans recovered a judgment for $150,000 against the
Daltons. 177 The Daltons filed for bankruptcy and stated there were two
secured mortgages against their homestead.
The first mortgage in favor
of the Daltons' son was never recorded and the second mortgage to
79
Monticello
Bank
was recorded
buttonever
Daltons never
0
amended their
bankruptcy
petition
correctdelivered.'
the "error."1' 18The
1166. Tiburon Ltd., 730 So. 2d at 755.

1167.Id.
1168.Id.
1169. Id. at 754.
1170. Id. at 755.
1171. Tiburon Ltd., 730 So. 2d at 755-56.
1172. Id. at 756.
1173.708 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1174. Id. at 324.

1175.Id.
1176. Id. at 325.

1177. Id.
1178. Clearman,708 So. 2d at 325.

1179.Id.
1180. Id.
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The trustee in bankruptcy elected to avoid the liens and obtained an
order from the bankruptcy court avoiding the mortgages, preserving the
avoided obligations "for the benefit of the estate. '11 8 The mortgages were
assigned to the Clearmans.1 82 After they recorded the assignment and the
judgments avoiding the mortgages, the Clearmans attempted to foreclose on
the interest acquired from the trustee.' 83 Dalton counterclaimed to quiet
title and for slander of title." 84 The trial court denied foreclosure and found
1 85
against the Clearmans on the Daltons' counterclaim for slander of title.
The court
awarded the Daltons attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment
186
interest.'
The appellate court agreed with the trial court holding that "even
though the obligations evidenced by avoiding the mortgages were preserved
for the estate, 11 U.S.C. § 544 does not place the Trustee ... in the place of
the former mortgagees with the power to foreclose and avoid the Daltons'
homestead claim."
It went on to hold "the bankruptcy estate did have an
assignable interest in the mortgages subject to the Daltons' claim of
homestead."' 1 88 The court ruled that the assignees paid a fair price for the
assignment, can assert18their
interest, and thus, can be required to establish
9
the fact of homestead.!
The appellate court determined that filing of judgments does not
constitute slander of title even if the assignment of the estate's interest was
in the nature of a quitclaim deed.119 The Daltons willingly filed their
91
bankruptcy petition and submitted their property to bankruptcy.'
Therefore, they cannot subsequently complain if the assignee of the estate's
interest requires
that they prove their entitlement to the homestead
92
exemption.1

1181. Id.
1182.1d.
1183. Cleannan,708 So. 2d at 325.
1184.Id.
1185.1d.
1186.Id.
1187.Id.
1188. Clearman, 708 So. 2d at 325.
1189.3d.
1190.Id.
1191.Id.
1192.Id.
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XXI. TAXATION

Fuchs v. Robbins.1 93 The issue here is whether the trial court properly
held section 192.042(1), of the Florida Statutes to be unconstitutional." 4
Section 192.042(1) of the FloridaStatutes requires that a zero valuation be
placed on buildings under construction and not substantially completed on
the taxing date, which is January first of each year.11gs
The appellate court held that the trial court was correct and the statute
was unconstitutional. 1196 The court determined the statute violated the
mandate of article VII, § 4, of the Florida Constitution (1968) that all real
property (with some inapplicable exceptions) be assessed and taxed at just
valuation.1 97 According to the court, just valuation is synonymous with fair
market value, and has been determined by the Supreme Court of Florida as
"[tihe amount a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy, would pay to one
willing but not obliged to sell."''198
This court held in McNayr v. Claughton' 99 that there are three well
recognized ways to appraise: 1) the cost approach; 2)the comparable sales
approach; and 3) the income or economic approach.12°° Here, the Master's
Report states that the property appraiser's expert used the comparable sales
approach and arrived at the $3,790,227 tax assessment valuation on the
improvements.'2 1 Therefore, on January 1, 1992 the incomplete hotel
structure had an uncontested just valuation of $3,790.227.1202 The court has
previously held in Interlachen Lake Estates v. Snyder, ITT Community
Development Corp. v. Seay, and Valencia Center, Inc. v. Bystrom that,
except where the constitution specifically authorizes it that legislation which
singles out classifications or properties for treatment that shows a tax
assessment valuation at something other than fair market value violates
article VII, section 4, of the Florida Constitution (1968)."'

1193.24 Fla. L. Weekly D1529 (3d Dist. Ct. App. June 30, 1999).
1194. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 192.042(1)(1991)).
1195. Id. (referring to the 1991 version of the FloridaStatutes).
1196.Id.
1197.Id.
1198.Fuchs,24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1530.
1199. 198 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
1200. Fuchs, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1530 (citing McNayr v. Claughton, 198 So. 2d 366
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
1201. Id.
1202. Id.
1203. Id.; see Snyder, 304 So. 2d at 433; Seay, 347 So. 2d at 1024; Bystrom, 543 So. 2d
at 214.

356

Nova Law Review
Kuro v. Department of Revenue. 1

4

[Vol. 24:267

Kuro, Inc. ("Kuro") appealed a

final order which assessed an additional documentary stamp tax
2
collectively, on conveyances of eight unencumbered condominium units. 03
Stock issued by Kuro in exchange for the condominiums was concluded in
the final order to constitute consideration and that, pursuant to the applicable
statutes and rules, this consideration was equal to the fair market value of the
condominiums. 12 The documentary stamp tax was based on the fair market
value. 2 07 This court reversed and found that levying the additional tax was
1208
error.
The condominiums were owned by a father and son team in
1991.1209

In 1994 the father and son incorporated Kuro.1210 They transferred

the units' titles to the corporation to avoid the potential personal liability for
managing the eight rental units. 1211 The father and son transferred each
condominium unit to Kuro by warranty deed.1 2 Each deed recited nominal
consideration of ten dollars and Kuro paid the minimum documentary stamp
tax on each transaction.1213
After conducting an audit, the Department of Revenue ("DOR")
determined that additional documentary stamp taxes were due. 1214 The
administrative law judge recommended the assessment of additional
documentary stamp taxes and the DOR entered a final order adopting these
recommendations.

The appellate court first looked at section 201.02(1) of the Florida
Statutes, which states that "a purchaser of real estate is required to pay a
documentary stamp tax of $.70 on each $100 of consideration" for the
property.1 6 It further states that when consideration given in exchange for
real property or any interest therein is other than money, it is presumed that
the consideration
is an amount that is equal to the fair market value of the
12 17
real property.

1204.713 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1205. Id.
1206. Id. at 1021-22.
1207. Id. at 1022.
1208. Id.
1209. Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1022.
1210. Id.
1211. Id.
1212. Id.
1213.Id.
1214. Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1022.
1215.Id.
1216. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 201.02(1) (1999).
1217. Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1022.
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The court found that Kuro was not a purchaser within the meaning of
section 210.02(1)."" Therefore, no additional taxes were due. 12 19 Section
210.02(1) applies to transfers of real estate for consideration to a purchaser
and "purchaser" has been defined by the Supreme Court of Florida as "'one
who obtains or acquires property by paying an equivalent in money or other
exchange in value."' " 2 ° The DOR's rule deals with stock as consideration
221 In this situation
and the statute merely creates a rebuttable presumption.
1222
presumption.
the
rebutted
Kuro successfully
The appellate court found the conveyances were for the benefit of the
father and son, who were availing themselves of the advantages of
incorporation, and that the father and son still were the beneficial owners
although not the legal owners. 1 m23 At the time the deeds were recorded the
father and son owned all of the real estate and Kuro's stock.1 4 The father
and son did not receive anything that they did not already have.125
Therefore, all that occurred were book transactions and not sales to a
purchaser./2 The court reversed the DOR's final order./91
The
S & W Air Vac Systems, Inc. v. Department of Revenue. l
appellate court affirmed the final administrative decision which held S & W
liable to the DOR for use taxes as the licensee of real property pursuant to
1 22 9
section 212.031 of the FloridaStatutes.
S & W owned coin-operated air vac machines used to vacuum cars and
add air to tires.12 30 Store owners having these machines received monthly
compensation in the form of a percentage of the unit's gross receipts.
S & W had the responsibility to collect money from the machines, make
repairs, and pay licensing fees and taxes on them.1232
S & W described this agreement as a "revenue sharing
arrangement.' ' 2 3 3 The hearing officer found that payment was based on the
1218.Id.
1219.Id.
1220.Id. (quoting Florida Dep't of Revenue v. De Maria, 338 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla.
1976)).
1221. Id.
1222.Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1022.
1223. Id.
1224. Id. at 1023.
1225. Id.
1226. Id. at 1022 (citing Palmer-Florida Corp. v. Green, 88 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1956)).
1227. Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1023.
1228.697 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1229. Id. at 1314; see FLA. STAT. § 212.031 (1999).
1230. S & WAir Vac Sys., 697 So. 2d at 1314.
1231. Id.
1232. Id. at 1314-15.
1233. Id.
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right to place the machine in these stores and store owners should not be
gaining compensation when the machine was removed. l2 34 The hearing
officer concluded that S & W had been granted licenses for the use of real
property.12 35 Section 212.03112of36 the Florida Statutes dictated that use taxes
were owed to the Department.
First, the facts showed that the air vac machines were not the subject of
a bailment. 1237 A "bailment" is a contractual relationship among parties in
is delivered temporarily to and
which the subject matter of the relationship
1238
accepted by one other than the owner.
Next, the arrangement with the store owners could not constitute joint
ventures.1239 To have a joint venture, five elements must be established in
addition to those required to form a basic contract.124° These elements
include: 1) a community of interest in the performance of the common
purpose; 2) joint control or right of control; 3) joint proprietary interest in
the subject matter; 4) a right to share in the profits; and 5) a duty to share in
the first element was met,
any losses which may be sustained. 1241 Although
124
the court recognized that the others were not. r
S & W also questioned whether convenience stores and gas stations met
section 212.031's use requirement.12 43 The statute states "it is declared to be
the legislative intent that every person is exercising a taxable privilege who
engages in the business of rentin leasing, letting, or granting a license for
the use of any real property ...."
The hearing officer and the Department of Revenue concluded the
transactions between S & W and store owners were taxable under section
212.031 of the FloridaStatutes.1245 That statute defines "business" as "any
activity engaged in by any person, or caused to be engaed by him, with the
object of private or public gain, benefit, or advantage."
In this situation, "the licensors operated a commercial premises
The
designed to attract customers for revenue generating purposes."
1234. IM
1235. S & WAir Vac Sys., 697 So. 2d at 1315.
1236. Id.
1237.See id.
1238. See 5 FLA. JuR. 2D Bailments § 1 (1978).
1239. S & WAir Vac Sys., 697 So. 2d at 1315-16.
1240. Id.
1241. Id. (citing to Conklin Shows, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 684 So. 2d 328, 332
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)); See also Kislak v. Kreedian, 95 So. 2d 510,515 (Fla. 1957).
1242. S & WAir Vac Sys., 697 So. 2d at 1315.
1243. Id. at 1316.
1244. Id. at 1316 (citing FLA. STAT. § 212.031(1)(a) (1993)).
1245. Id.
1246. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 212.02(2) (1989)).
1247. S & WAir Vac Sys., 697 So. 2d at 1317.

1999]

Brown/Grohman

ventures included income derived from a range of premises activity. 128

Therefore, it was not a clearly erroneous interpretation to determine that
store owners were in the business of granting a license under section 212.02
and 212.031 of the FloridaStatutes.12
gd
Smith v. Welton.12 50 The issue this court heard on appeal was whether
section 193.155(8)(a) of the FloridaStatutes, is facially unconstitutional in
light of article VII, section (4)(c) of the Florida Constitution. 125 In Smith,
the court stated that article VII, section (4)(c) provides:
Taxation; assessments.-By general law regulations shall be
prescribed which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad
valorem taxation, provided:
(c) All persons entitled to a homestead exemption under Section 6
of this Article shall have their homestead assessed at just value as
of January 1 [,19941. This assessment shall change only as
provided herein.
1. Assessments subject to this provision shall be changed
annually on January 1st of each year; but those changes in
assessments shall not exceed the lower of the following:
(A) three percent (3%) of the assessment for the prior year.
(B)the percent change in the Consumer Price Index for all urban
consumers, U.S. City Average, all items 1967=100, or successor
reports for the preceding calendar year as initially reported by the
United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2. No assessment shall exceed just value.
3. After any change of ownership, as provided by general law,
homestead property shall be assessed at just value as of January 1
of the following year. Thereafter, the homestead shall be assessed
as provided herein.
4. New homestead property shall be assessed at just value as of
January 1st of the year following the establishment of the
homestead. That assessment shall only change as provided herein.
5. Changes, additions, reductions or improvements to homestead
property shall be assessed as provided for by general law;
provided, however, after the adjustment for any change, addition,
reduction or improvement, the property shall be assessed as
provided herein.
1248. Id.
1249. Id.
1250.710 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1251.Id. at 136.
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6. In the event of a termination of homestead
status, the property
2 52
shall be assessed as provided by general law.
However, section 193.155(8)(a) of the FloridaStatutes provides:
(8) Erroneous assessments of homestead property assessed under
this section may be corrected in the following manner:
(a) If errors are made in arriving at any annual assessment under
this section due to material mistake of fact concerning an essential
characteristic of the property, the assessment must be recalculated
for every such year.
The trial court found that section 193.155(8)(a) is unconstitutional
because the constitution states clearly that the assessment of just value shall
only change as provided by the statute and section 193.155(8)(a?lermits
changes to the assessment that are not found in the constitution.
This
court found that section 193.155(8)(a) of the Florida Statutes is facially
unconstitutional because the purported exception to the three percent rule
contained in
section 193.155(8)(a) is not one provided for in the
12 55
constitution.
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that provisions of the
Constitution cannot alter, contract or enlarge legislation. 6 The court
determined in this case that the statute in question would defeat the purpose
of article VII, section (4)(c) by allowing constant reassessments of
homesteads when the purpose of section (4)(c) of article VII is to encourage
the preservation of homestead property in the face of increasing
real estate
Z5 7
development and rising property values and assessments.
Furthermore, this court found no merit to appellant's argument that
without section 193.155(8)(a) there would be inequitable taxation since the
constitution expressly mandates the special or inequitable taxation.125s Only
the homestead property receives the three percent cap and, therefore
nonhomestead property, commercial, agricultural, and noncommercial
recreational land are excluded from the three percent cap.125 9 Further, the
constitution provides that assessments shall not exceed just value, but does

1252. Id. at 136-37 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(c)).
1253. FLA. STAT. § 193.155(8)(a) (1999).
1254. Smith, 710 So. 2d at 136.
1255. Id. at 137.
1256. Id. at 138; see Ostemdorf v. Turner, 426 So. 2d 539, 544 (Fla. 1982).

1257. See Smith, 710 So. 2d at 138.
1258. Id. at 137.
1259. Id.
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not say that assessments shall not be below just value.l 2 ° Therefore,
this
26 1
court held that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment.
Legislative changes include, but are not limited to, the following:
The Florida Legislature enacted chapter 98-185 to be retroactive to
January 1, 1998 and to be effective until it expired on July 1, 1999.26 This
chapter provides for a partial abatement of ad valorem taxation where
property has been destroyed or damaged by tornadoes. 1263 The application
for such abatement must be filed by the owner with the property appraiser
before March 1 following the tax year in which the destruction or damage
occurred. 1 4 Chapter 6 discusses the detail and criteria to be included in the
application and what events will occur if the properl appraiser determines
the applicant to be entitled to such partial abatement.
Section 196.1977 of the FloridaStatutes provides:
[e]ach apartment in a continuing care facility certified under
chapter 651, which facility is not qualified for exemption under
[section] 196.1975 or other similar exemption, is exempt to the
extent of $25,000 of assessed valuation of such property for each
apartment which is occupied on January 1 of the year in which
exemption from ad valorem property taxation is requested by a
person holding a continuing care contract as defined under chapter
651 who resides therein
and in good faith makes the same his or
1 266
her permanent home.
These provisions shall take effect January 1, 1999
126 7and shall apply to the
1999 tax rolls and each subsequent year's tax rolls.
XXII. TIMESHARES
Effective April 30, 1998
1268 amendments to chapter 721 of the Florida
Statutes became effective.
Those changes include, but are not limited to,
the following:
To section 721.05 the legislature added a definition of "regulated shortterm product."1 269 That term is defined as
1260. Id.; see Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1992).
1261. Smith, 710 So. 2d at 138.
1262.1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-185.
1263. Ch. 98-185, § 1(1), 1999 Fla.Laws 1616, 1616.
1264. Id. § l(1)(a), 1999 Fla. Laws at 1616.

1265. I
1266.FLA. STAT. § 196.1977 (1999).
1267.Id. § 196.1979 n.1.
1268. FLA.

STAT.

§ 721 (1999).
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a contractual right, offered by the seller, to use accommodations of
a timeshare plan, provided that:
(a) The agreement ... is executed in this state on the same day that
the prospective purchaser receives an offer to acquire an interest in
a timeshare plan and does not execute a purchase contract, after
attending a sales presentation; and
(b) The acquisition of the right to use includes an agreement that all
or a portion of the consideration paid by the prospective purchaser
for the right to use will be applied to or credited against the price of
a future purchase of a timeshare interest, or that the cost of a future
purchase of a timeshare interest will be fixed or locked in at a
specified price.1270
An item of consideration that the legislature deleted is section
721.075(4) of the Florida Statutes.127 '
That paragraph required the
developer to file an irrevocable letter of credit, surety bond, or other
assurance acceptable to the director of the division where the aggregate
represented value of all incidental benefits offered by a developer to a
purchaser 1272
exceeded five percent of the purchase price paid by that
purchaser.
However, that2requirement
has been deleted and is no longer a
73
scheme.
statutory
the
of
part
The legislature added subsection (c) to section 721.09(1) of the Florida
Statutes. 27 This new provision provides that "the seller must immediately
cancel all outstanding reservation agreements, refund all escrowed funds to
prospective purchasers, and discontinue accepting reservation deposits or
advertising the availability of reservation agreements," where the time share
plan subject to the reservation agreement has not been filed with the division
as required by Florida law within ninety275days after the date the division
approves the reservation agreement filing.
To that same statute the legislature added subsection (1)(d)."' This
section permits the seller who has filed a reservation agreement and escrow
agreement program as required by statute to advertise the reservation
agreement providing the material meets the criteria prescribed by the
subsections to subparagraph (d). 277
1269. Id. § 721.05(27).
1270. Id.
1271. Id. § 721.075(4).
1272. Id.
1273. FLA. STAT. § 721.075(4) (1999).
1274. Id. § 721.09(l)(c).
1275. Id.
1276. Id. § 721.09(l)(d).
1277. Id.
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Section 721.11 of the Florida Statutes added subsection (6) and its
subparts. 127 These provisions state that failing to provide cancellation rights
or disclosures required in connection with the sale of a regulated short-term
product automatically constitutes a misrepresentation in accordance with
subsection (4)(a) of this statute.1279 Section 721.11(6)(a) requires the filing
within ten days prior to use of a standard form of any agreement relating to
the sale of a regulated short-term product.1S ° Subsection (b) of that statute
establishes the right of a purchaser of a regulated short-term product to
cancel the agreement until midnight of the tenth calendar day following the
execution date of the agreement.' 2 8' It also provides that the right of
cancellation may not be waived by the prospective purchaser or anyone on
his or her behalf.18 2 Subsection (c) and its subparts with respect to this
same statute provide for statements that must be included in an agreement
for purchase of a regulated short-term product.12 3 Further, subsection (d) of
the same statute provides for a series of statements in conspicuous type that
must be included
in an agreement for the purchase of a regulated short-term
24
product.'
Section (e) of the foregoing statute also provides for an exemption from
the requirements of subsection (b), (c), and (d).1' s5 Where the seller
provides the purchaser with the right to cancel the purchase of a regulated
short-term product for any time up to seven days before the purchasers
reserved use of the accommodations, but never less than ten days, and if the
seller refunds the total amount of all payments made by the purchaser
reduced by the proportion of any benefits the purchaser has actually received
prior to the effective date of the cancellation, the specific value of which has
been agreed to by the purchaser and seller, the short-term product offer
286 shall
be exempt from the requirements of the aforementioned paragraphs.1
To section 721.15 the legislature added subparagraph (1)(b).11 7 This
section provides for allocating total common expenses for a condominium or
cooperative timeshare plan and allowing such to vary on a reasonable basis
if "the percentage is any interest in the common elements attributable to each

1278. FA. STAT. § 721.11(6) (1999).
1279. Id.

1280.Id. § 721.11(6)(a).
1281.Id. § 721.11(6)(b).
1282. Id.
1283. FA. STAT. § 721.11(6)(c) (1999).
1284. Id. § 721.11(6)(d).
1285. Id.§ 721.11(6)(e).
1286.Id.
1287. FLA. STAT. § 721.15(1)(b) (1999).
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time share condominium parcel or timeshare cooperative parcel
equals the
8
share of the total common expenses allocable to that parcel."2
To chapter 721 the legislature added the Timeshare Lien Foreclosure
Act. This act consists of sections 721.80 through 721.86 and should be read
in detail to become familiar with the rights and procedures involved.
The legislature also added sections 721.96 through 721.98 to the
Florida Statutes. These statutes provide for establishing a commissioner of
deeds to take acknowledgments, proofs of execution, and oaths outside the
United States in connection with the execution of any instruments relating to
or being used in connection with a timeshare estate.12 9 These sections
should be read in detail.
XXIII. TME INSURANCE
Security Union Title Inurance. Co. v. Citibank, N.A.' 2 g The First
District Court of Appeal was asked to review a jury verdict finding the title
insurance underwriter vicariously liable for fraud committed by its agent, an
attorney, when he made fraudulent representations to the lender to obtain
loans, some of which benefitted him personally and others of which
benefitted his clients.12g Noting that the agent was expressly authorized
only to sign and issue title insurance commitments and policies and that the
losses did not occur from his acting in such a capacity,
the appellate court
1292
found no vicarious liability under that authority.
Next, it considered whether there might be vicarious liability arising
from the agent's acting within his apparent authority. 1293 In doing so, the
appellate court noted that at least one element needed for this liability is that
there must have been some representation by the principal.1 94 Here the facts
showed only that the principal who represented the agent had the authority to
issue title commitments and policies. 2 95 The fraudulent acts involved the
There were no
agent's representations made to obtain loans. 1296
representations by the underwriter that the agent had any authority to make
1288. Id.
1289. Id. § 721.96.
1290.715 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, (Aug. 25, 1998),
review dismissed, Citibank, N.A. v. Security Union Title Ins., 728 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1998).
1291. Id.
1292. Id.
1293. Id.
1294. Id. at 975. Presumably this representation must be one that would lead the claimant
to have relied reasonably on the appearance that the agent had the authority to commit the act that
caused the harm.
1295. Citibank, 715 So. 2d at 975.
1296. Id.

1999]

Brown/Grohman

statements as a closing agent to obtain loans.1297 Also, it was clear that the
loans were for both his personal benefit and his clients' benefit. 298
Therefore, the appellate court reversed and1 299
remanded with instructions to
enter a judgment in favor of the underwriter.
Legislative changes include, but are not limited to the following:
chapter 99-286 of the Laws of Floridaprovides such changes to sections 624
and 627 of the FloridaStatutes as differentiated ratings and premium splits
for real estate transactions exceeding $1,000,000; legislative clarifications
for such terms as "premium"
and "primary title services;" and a restructuring
13
of reserve requirements. 0
XXIV. CONCLUSION

The foregoing survey presents selected materials of significance to real
estate professionals. 01 There seems to be no consistent pattern to the case
law or legislative developments, but, as always, there is plenty for the reader
to ponder. Real estate law continues to evolve in interesting ways.

1297. Id.
1298. Id. at 975.
1299. Id. at 976.
1300.1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-286.
1301. Readers are also urged to read the article on zoning and land use controls.

